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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
SHORT SELLING: IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
by
Mohammad Anisur Rahman
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Suchismita Mishra, Major Professor
The literature on short selling documents substantial evidence that short sellers are
generally informed investors (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Asquith and
Muelbrook, 1996). This dissertation investigates three specific implications of informed
short selling for a firm and its investors.
The first essay investigates if short selling discourages managers from pursuing
over-optimistic projects by reducing equity market timing. By conditioning short selling
on firm overvaluation, this essay shows that short selling reduces managerial equity market
timing and increases leverage. This moderating impact of short selling is more pronounced
in smaller firms and those with low institutional ownership or higher intangible assets.
Furthermore, the results show that board independence facilitates the above effect of short
selling which helps protect shareholder interests.
The second essay investigates if board independence reduces informed short selling
prior to earnings announcements. This essay estimates short sellers’ correct prediction of
the direction of unexpected quarterly earnings through Logistic regression and finds that
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short sellers’ correct prediction decreases in firms with independent boards relative to firms
with non-independent boards. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced in firms with
CEO duality and large board size. The quasi-natural experiment using the exogenous shock
to board independence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, provides further support to
our hypotheses.
The third essay provides Sell recommendations by examining pre-announcement
short selling of firms ahead of their earnings announcements. The methodology makes Sell
recommendations for firms with the highest short position prior to their quarterly earnings
announcement. The post-announcement raw, excess, and abnormal returns of firms having
the Sell recommendations are statistically and economically significant for multipleholding periods showing the methodology’s significant trading strategy implication.
This dissertation significantly contributes to short selling, governance, capital
structure, and investment literature.
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CHAPTER 1: SHORT SELLERS AND MANAGERIAL EQUITY MARKET TIMING
1.1 Introduction
Existing capital structure studies have documented ample evidence of the
importance of managerial equity market timing (e.g., Marsh, 1982; Pagano, Panetta, and
Zingales, 1998; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002)
in the management of a firm’s capital structure. The core idea of these studies is that
managers take advantage of the temporary market and/or firm overvaluation to issue shares
at higher prices and repurchase shares at lower prices, which eventually affects a firm’s
capital structure. If firms have a need for external financing to support positive NPV
projects, then managerial equity market timing may be considered as a rational choice as
issuing equity is the most cost-effective external financing strategy during overvaluation.
However, if a firm is overvalued without enough growth projects, which may happen, for
example, if the market is over-optimistic about the firm because of information asymmetry,
then this overvaluation can exert pressure on managers to pursue overoptimistic projects
(Polk and Sapienza, 2009) to support the current price level, and consequently, time the
equity market. In this case, overvaluation-driven equity market timing may destroy firm
value.
Current studies of equity market timing did not draw a distinction between equity
market timing to support future positive NPV projects and equity market timing to take
advantage of market sentiment, which may or may not be justified by growth opportunities.
In this paper, we aim at addressing this gap by examining the implications of overvaluation
on other market participants (i.e., short sellers) and how this may interact with managerial
equity market timing. The literature on short selling documents substantial evidence that
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short sellers are able to identify overvalued firms (e.g., Seneca, 1967; Figlewski, 1981;
Senchack and Starks, 1993; Asquith and Muelbrook, 1996; Desai et al., 2002). Thus, the
same temporary episodes of overvaluation that create opportunities for cheap equity
issuance for managers also offer great opportunities for short selling in anticipation of
future price decline. With further evidence of short sellers adding to price discovery in the
financial markets (e.g., Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu, 2007; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang,
2008; Boehmer and Wu, 2013; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011), managers may want to
consider the adverse information embedded in short selling when deciding whether to cater
to high market sentiment and issue equity by taking advantage of the overvaluation. Thus,
short sellers may provide important check and balances in managerial equity market timing
by uncovering important adverse information about future projects, which is the focus of
this paper.
Drawing on the above existing empirical evidence that managers may invest in
over-optimistic projects under overvaluation and that short selling is high if a firm is
overvalued, we hypothesize that conditioned on overvaluation, short selling will uncover
adverse information about the firm (e.g. overinvestment in projects), decrease equity
issuance, and thus will result in an increase in leverage. We test this hypothesis on both
book and market leverage and document similar results.
The first challenge in testing our hypothesis is to come up with a reliable measure
of misvaluation to evaluate firm leverage behavior under overvaluation. Existing literature
frequently uses market-to-book (MB) (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Kayhan and
Titman, 2007) as a measure of misvaluation. However, MB includes book value, a
backward-looking measure of the fundamental value of a firm, and therefore, a high MB
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may reflect market expectations of high growth opportunities or overvaluation or both (see,
e.g., Hovakimian, 2006; Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2012). Therefore, it is difficult to
test the effects of overvaluation on capital structure based solely on MB (Dong, Hirshleifer,
and Teoh, 2012). In this paper, we address this issue by adopting an alternative measure of
misvaluation, value-to-price (VP), where value is a forward-looking measure of the
fundamental value (V) of a firm based on the residual income model of Ohlson (1995).1
By including a forward-looking measure instead of the historical book value of equity, VP
purges growth expectations from market prices reasonably well and provides us with a
more refined measure of misvaluation than MB. We then use VP to estimate an increase in
overvaluation and condition an increase in SI on an increase in overvaluation to examine
the impact of short selling on leverage during overvaluation. Following the convention in
the short selling literature (Dechow et al., 2001; Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Karpoff
and Lou, 2010; Henry, Kisgen, and Wu, 2011; Grullon, Michenaud and Weston, 2015), we
divide a firm’s monthly/bi-monthly short interest (SI) by its total shares outstanding to
proxy for short selling. We use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to regress leverage on the
above conditioning variable (an increase in SI conditioned on an increase in overvaluation),
MB, and the traditional determinants of leverage as identified in past studies (Titman and
Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001; Welch,
2004; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Kayhan and Titman, 2007).2 The results from estimating
1

Prior literature has implemented the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) to estimate VP to use as a
measure of misvaluation in both repurchase (D’Mello and Shroff, 2000) and equity issuance (Dong,
Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2012) decisions.
2

We include MB along with VP because the forward-looking fundamental value V may not perfectly capture
growth opportunities and MB is more heavily weighted toward information about growth opportunities than
VP. Thus, including both in the model makes the model stringent (see, e.g., Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh,
2012).
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the above model show that book leverage increases by 1.4% when short selling increases
after an increase in overvaluation.
The governance literature provides an excellent opportunity to test our hypothesis
that short selling disciplines the managers, attenuates managerial equity market timing, and
thereby increases leverage. Specifically, this literature finds that independent directors are
better at monitoring management (see, e.g., Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010). Accordingly, we
hypothesize that the impact of short selling will be higher if the firm’s board is independent,
as independent directors will be more willing to pay attention to short sellers’ opinions than
dependent directors due to agency problems. To test this hypothesis, we estimate our model
separately on the subsamples of firms with independent boards and non-independent
boards. Following Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), we classify a board as independent if
independent directors constitute the majority of the board. The results show that the
moderating impact of short selling on book leverage is significantly positive among firms
with independent boards and insignificant among firms with non-independent boards. This
finding supports the above hypothesis.
Existing studies document that some firm characteristics increase the likelihood of
a firm to be overvalued. Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) note that smaller firms are
harder to value and are subject to an increased likelihood of misvaluation. Many studies on
short selling (Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite,
1993; Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Hong and Stein, 2003)
argue and provide empirical support for the idea that stock prices suffer from an upward
bias in the presence of short selling constraints. Furthermore, high research and
development (R&D) expenses may indicate good growth prospects. However, because
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market participants will have differences in opinions, they will also attach different values
to the prospects of the R&D, leading to an increased likelihood of misvaluation. Given the
above evidence of how firm size, short selling constraints, and R&D may affect the
likelihood of misvaluation, we hypothesize that the impact of short selling on leverage will
be more prominent in smaller firms, in firms with lower institutional ownership (low
institutional ownership proxying for high short selling constraints), or in firms with higher
R&D. We estimate our model on Low, Medium, and High measures of Size (firm size),
R&D, and institutional ownership and find results supporting our above hypothesis.
Overall, our results suggest that short selling has an offsetting impact on equity market
timing for overvalued firms, leading to an increase in leverage, and especially so for firms
with independent boards, smaller firms, firms with lower institutional ownership, and firms
with more intangible assets.
Our study makes valuable contributions to multiple strands of literature. Based on
our literature reviews, this study is the first of its kind to examine equity market timing in
relation to short selling. Past studies focused only on the managerial incentives to time
equity market when the firm is overvalued. Our study links the implications of
overvaluation for other market participants to managerial incentives and shows that equity
market timing is sensitive to short selling. Thus, our results contribute to a better
understanding of managerial decision making with respect to external financing. By
showing that short sellers provide important check and balances in the financial markets
for proper asset allocation, we add to the short selling literature, particularly to the marketbased monitoring mechanism of short selling. We also add to the governance literature as
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our results show that board independence strengthens the disciplining impact of short
selling on managerial market timing.
1.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses
If a firm is overvalued, that is, if the firm does not have enough growth projects to
justify its valuation, then short sellers, who are considered informed investors, will short
sell that stock in anticipation of a future decline in price. The adverse information
embedded in high short selling will discourage managers to pursue overoptimistic projects
and reduce their issuance of equity which will result in an increase of leverage. This leads
to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The leverage of an overvalued firm will increase in response to an
increase in short selling, as short selling attenuates managerial equity market timing.
The above hypothesis suggests that managers will pay attention to the short sellers’
opinions as embedded into the short position and adjust their equity market timing
accordingly. Governance literature shows that independent directors are better at
monitoring management (Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010). Therefore, board independence
should facilitate the incorporation of short sellers’ adverse information into managerial
decision making, which leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The moderating impact of short selling on managerial equity market
timing during overvaluation will be more pronounced in firms with independent boards
than in firms with non-independent boards, as independent directors will be more willing
to pay attention to short sellers’ opinions than non-independent directors due to lower
agency problems, leading to a higher increase in leverage.
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Existing studies document that some firm characteristics (e.g., small firm size, high
R&D, low institutional ownership) increase the likelihood of a firm to be overvalued.
Therefore, we also expect that short sellers will actively target the firms with such
characteristics and the impact of short selling on leverage will be more prominent among
such firms. Below we discuss this issue thoroughly and form our hypotheses accordingly.
Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) find that equity issuance increases with firm
overvaluation. Furthermore, these researchers find that this effect on equity issuance is
more pronounced in smaller firms because smaller firms are harder to value and are subject
to an increased likelihood of misvaluation. Many influential studies have examined the
implications of short selling constraints (Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Allen,
Morris, and Postlewaite, 1993; Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002; Scheinkman and Xiong,
2003; Hong and Stein, 2003). These studies theorize and provide empirical support to the
idea that when there are no short selling constraints, pessimistic investors can easily short
sell securities, counterbalancing optimistic valuation. As a result, stock prices, on average,
do not suffer significant upward bias. However, when short selling constraints exist,
pessimistic investors find it difficult to short sell securities, which cause a positive bias in
stock prices. Some of these studies use institutional ownership to proxy for short selling
constraints and find that when institutional ownership increases (decreases), short selling
constraints decrease (increase) (Nagel, 2004; Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002). The presence
of intangible assets in a firm makes it difficult for the market to value it correctly. For
example, high research and development expenses (R&D) may indicate good growth
prospects. However, because market participants will have differences in opinions, they
will also attach different values to the prospects of R&D, leading to an increased likelihood
7

of overvaluation or undervaluation. In studying the effects of overvalued equity on
financing decisions, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) document that the effect of
misvaluation on issuances is stronger among firms with higher proportions of intangible
assets. Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for misvaluation, Polk and Sapienza (2009)
find that investment is more sensitive to misvaluation among firms with higher R&D
intensity. The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3. The moderating impact of short selling on managerial equity market
timing during overvaluation will be more pronounced in smaller firms, in firms with lower
institutional ownership (lower institutional ownership proxying for higher short selling
constraints), or in firms with higher R&D.
1.3 Data
For our analysis, we use annual fundamental and monthly/bi-monthly short interest
data from Supplemental Short Interest File of Compustat.3 We obtain market data from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Short interest data are available only
from 1973 restricting our initial sample period from 1973 to 2014. We limit our analysis
to the U.S common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11). We exclude financial services
firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and regulated utility firms (SIC codes 4900–4999) from our
sample. Furthermore, following Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Liu (2009), we exclude
firms with book values of assets smaller than $10 million or book debt-to-book assets ratio
larger than one. The presence of missing values and use of lagged explanatory variables

3

Beginning in September 2007, member firms of Amex, NASD and NYSE are required to submit short
interest information twice a month. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 55406 (March 6, 2007), 72 FR
11071 (March 12, 2007) (order approving SR-NASD-2006-131, SR-NYSE-2006-111, SR-Amex-2007-005).
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further reduce our sample size, resulting in 50,315 firm-year observations spanning the
period from 1974 to 2014. For our value-to-price (VP), we use I/B/E/S mean forecasted
earnings per share (EPS) data, which are available only since January 1979, and thus further
reduces our final sample size to only 26,270 (book leverage sample) and 26,263 (market
leverage sample) firm-year observations.
Following the short selling literature (Dechow et al., 2001; Asquith, Pathak, and
Ritter, 2005; Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu, 2006; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Henry,
Kisgen, and Wu, 2011; Grullon, Michenaud and Weston, 2015), we divide a firm’s
monthly/bi-monthly short interest (SI) by its total shares outstanding to proxy for short
selling (SI). To capture a greater level of variation and allow more informativeness in short
selling, we take the average of SI from four months after the fiscal year-end to three months
prior to the beginning of the next fiscal year and deflate it with the cross-sectional mean of
SI. We maintain a gap of four months to match fundamental data as of the fiscal year-end
to avoid look-ahead bias because it takes approximately four months for the 10-K of most
firms to be publicly available (see, e.g., Alford, Jones, and Zmijewski, 1994). We also
maintain a gap of three months prior to next fiscal year-end because a firm is unlikely to
change its capital structure immediately.
We perform our analysis on both book leverage and market leverage because
existing literature adopts book leverage (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999), market
leverage (e.g., Welch, 2004), and both book and market leverage (e.g., Baker and Wurgler,
2002; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). We define book leverage as book debt to total assets
(Compustat item [6]), where book debt is the sum of long-term debt (Compustat item [9])
and debt in current liabilities (Compustat item [34]). We define market leverage as book
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debt divided by the result of total assets minus book equity plus market equity, where
market equity is defined as common shares outstanding (Compustat item [25]) times price
(Compustat item [199])4.
We construct several control variables that past capital structure studies have
documented as reliable determinants of firm leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan
and Zingales, 1995; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001; Welch, 2004; Baker and
Wurgler, 2002; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). These determinants include market-to-book
ratio (MB) defined as total assets (Compustat item [34]) less book equity (Compustat item
[144]) plus market equity (defined above), all divided by total assets; property, plant, and
equipment (PPE) defined as net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item [141])
scaled by total assets; profitability (EBITD) defined as operating income before
depreciation (Compustat item [13]) scaled by total assets; research and development
expenses (R&D) defined as research and development expenses (Compustat item [46])
scaled by net sales (Compustat item [117]); R&DDummy, a dummy variable that is set to
one if the firm has no R&D expenses, otherwise zero; selling expenses (SE) defined as
selling expenses (Compustat item [132]) scaled by net sales, and firm size (Size) defined
as the logarithmic value of net sales.
1.4 Methodology
1.4.1 Measure of Overvaluation
In this paper, our objective is to examine how short selling affects leverage when a firm is
overvalued. Therefore, an important task for our empirical analysis is to construct a reliable

4

We perform our analysis on several alternative definitions of leverage and note similar results. We discuss
this analysis in our robustness section.
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measure of misvaluation which can then be analyzed for overvaluation or undervaluation.
Existing literature frequently uses market-to-book (MB) to measure misvaluation (see, e.g.,
Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). However, there are non-trivial issues
in using MB as a measure of misvaluation. MB includes a backward-looking measure of
the fundamental value of a firm, book value, whereas current market price may reflect both
misvaluation and growth opportunities. Therefore, a high MB may reflect market
expectations of high growth opportunities or overvaluation or both (see, e.g., Hovakimian,
2006; Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2012), isolation of which is difficult. Therefore, it is
difficult to test the effects of overvaluation on capital structure based solely on MB (Dong,
Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2012). However, an estimate of the “true” fundamental value of a
firm, which incorporates growth opportunities reasonably well, scaled by current market
price would yield a more refined (less confounded with growth opportunities) measure of
misvaluation. The residual income model of Ohlson (1995) provides such an estimate of
“true” fundamental value, also called “intrinsic value” (V). Several past studies rely on this
methodology to estimate intrinsic value and misvaluation. Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan
(1999) use the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) to obtain the intrinsic value of the
30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Frankel and Lee (1998) use it to
predict cross-sectional stock returns in the U.S. D’Mello and Shroff (2000) use it to
estimate misvaluation to examine whether undervaluation affects repurchase decisions.
Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) use it to examine how equity overvaluation affects
corporate financing decisions. As in previous research on intrinsic value and misvaluation,
we also implement the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) to construct a more refined
measure of misvaluation than MB.
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We follow Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) and Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh
(2012) in implementing the residual income model of Ohlson (1995). Ohlson (1995) shows
that if a firm's earnings and book value follow "clean surplus" accounting, then the intrinsic
value of a stock is equal to book value plus the discounted value of an infinite sum of
expected residual incomes.5 Mathematically, intrinsic value (V) can be expressed in the
following manner:
∞

𝑉𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 + ∑
𝑖=1

𝐸𝑡 [{𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡 }𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1 ]
[1 + 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡 ]𝑖

(1)

where t indexes time, 𝐸 is the expectations operator, 𝐵 is the book value of equity, ROE is
the return on equity, and r(e) is the firm’s annualized cost of equity capital.
The above equation expresses firm value in terms of an infinite series. For practical
purposes, we adopt a two-stage approach to estimate the intrinsic value: (1) Forecast
earnings explicitly for the next three years and (2) Estimate the terminal value taking the
period t+3 residual income as a perpetuity6. Following this two-stage approach, we express
V as below:
𝑓

𝑉𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 +

𝑓

[{𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 − 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡 }𝐵𝑡 ] [{𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+2 − 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡 }𝐵𝑡+1 ]
+
[1 + 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡 ]2
1 + 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡
𝑓

𝐸𝑡 [{𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+3 − 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡 }𝐵𝑡+2 ]
+
[1 + 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡 ]2 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡

(2)

5

Clean surplus accounting requires all gains and losses affecting the book value of a stock to be included in
earnings. This implies that the periodic change in book value is equal to earnings minus dividends.
6

Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) use three different forecast horizons, namely 3, 12, and 18, but
document that the choice of forecast horizon does not affect the quality of the estimate of the intrinsic value
(V).
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𝑓

where 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 is the forecasted return on equity for period t+1 and the last term discounts
the period t+3 residual income as a perpetuity. The underlying assumption of the model is
that the expected residual earnings remain constant after year t+3 so that the discount rate
for the perpetuity is the firm’s cost of equity capital (see, e.g., Lee, Myers, and
Swaminathan, 1999; Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2012). Following Dong, Hirshleifer, and
Teoh (2012), the forecasted ROE is computed as:
𝑓
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑖

𝑓

𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑖
=
𝐵̅𝑡+𝑖−1

(3)

𝑓

where 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑖 is I/B/E/S mean forecasted EPS for period t+i and
𝐵̅𝑡+𝑖−1 =

𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1 + 𝐵𝑡+𝑖−2
2

(4)

This approach requires forecasting the future value of book equity (for period t+2
and t+3). We estimate future values of book equity as:
𝑓

𝐵𝑡+𝑖 = 𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1 + (1 − 𝑘)𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑖

(5)

where k is the dividend payout ratio computed by dividing actual dividends
from the last fiscal year by earnings over the same time period. Following Lee, Myers, and
Swaminathan (1999) and Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012), we implement the following
additional procedures. First, earnings are assumed to be on average 6% of total assets if k
is negative due to negative earnings. That is, the amount of dividends paid divided by the
results of 0.06 times total assets replaces the original estimate of k when k is negative.
Second, observations where k is greater than one or book value of equity is negative are
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simply deleted. Finally, a constant discount rate of 12.5% is used for the firm’s annualized
cost of equity capital.7
1.4.2 Empirical Specification
To examine how short selling affects leverage when the firm is overvalued based
on the misvaluation measure of VP, we first define two dummy variables: VPDummy and
SIDummy. VPDummy is coded one if changes in VP (∆VP) are negative, and zero
otherwise. Similarly, SIDummy is coded one if changes in SI (∆SI) are positive, and zero
otherwise. Then, we construct an interaction term between the above two dummy variables
and multiply by ∆SI (INTERACT). Because ∆VP = 1 indicates an increase in overvaluation
and ∆SI = 1indicates an increase in SI, which is expected when short sellers do not agree
with the existing valuation, the above interaction term INTERACT captures the impact of
short selling on firm leverage during times of firm overvaluation, and by multiplying
INTERACT with ∆SI, we also capture how sensitive leverage is with respect to an increase
in ∆SI. In our model, we include INTERACT, ∆VP, ∆SI, MB, and several firm
characteristics following past capital structure studies as discussed in the previous section.
We include MB in the same model to make our test most stringent, as MB is more heavily
weighted toward information about growth opportunities than VP, and VP may still contain
information about growth opportunities because we use analysts’ forecasts only for few
years ahead in estimating the intrinsic value (V). Following Kayhan and Titman (2007), we
also control for industry fixed effects. Therefore, our model is:

7

Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) also use Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Fama-French threefactor model to estimate cost of equity and obtain similar results.
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𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(6)

where t indexes time and i indexes firm; 𝐿 represents leverage; ∆SI is changes in short
interest; SIDummy is a dummy variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero;
VPDummy is a dummy variable coded one when ∆VP is negative, else zero; INTERACT is
an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, SIDummy, and ∆SI; X is a vector of firm
characteristics that affects leverage, including market-to-book (MB), Prop., Plant & Equip.
(PPE), Profitability (EBITD), Selling Expense (SE), Reseach & Development Expenses
(R&D), R&DDummy, and firm size (Size). We implement the above model separately for
book and market leverage because current literature adopts both. As per our hypothesis,
we expect INTERACT to be positively correlated with leverage (both book and market
leverage).
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics of our dependent and
independent variables. We calculate the statistics after winsorizing the variables at the 1st
and 99th percentiles within each fiscal year to mitigate the impact of outliers. The statistics
of the variables in our study are very close to the statistics reported in the comparable
studies. For example, the mean values of BL and Size are 0.21 and 6.78, respectively, which
compare closely to 0.24 and 5.23, the mean values of leverage and Size, respectively, in
Hovakimian (2006). Similarly, the mean values of PPE, MB, and EBITD are 0.30, 1.74,
and 0.14, respectively, which compare closely to 0.32, 1.73, and 0.10, the mean values of
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PPE, MB, and EBITD, respectively, in Liu (2009). The mean value of SI is 0.035 which
compares well to the mean value of 0.022 for SI in Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu (2011). Panel
B shows the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients among the variables in our study which
show that all of the variables are strongly significant in directions consistent with prior
studies. For example, in consistence with prior studies (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Kayhan
and Titman, 2007), MB, EBITD, SE, and R&D are all negatively, and PPE and Size are
positively, correlated with BL and ML. Furthermore, we note that both SI and ∆SI are
positively correlated with BL and ML.
1.5.2 Overvaluation and Short Selling
Our first hypothesis states that the leverage of a firm will increase with an increase
in short selling conditional on an increase in overvaluation. To test this hypothesis, we
estimate Eq. (6) where our variable of interest is INTERACT. As per our hypothesis, we
expect INTERACT to be positively significant. We present the results in Table 1.2 which
show that INTERACT is positive and strongly significant. The coefficient estimate of
INTERACT is 0.014 indicating that BL increases by 1.4% following an increase in SI
conditioned on an increase in firm overvaluation. The strongly significant negative
coefficient of VPDummy also captures the well-documented evidence of managerial equity
market timing when a firm is overvalued. Furthermore, the significantly positive
coefficient estimate of SIDummy indicates that regardless of the direction of the change in
the past firm valuation (increase or decrease), BL increases as SI increases. By comparing
the magnitude of the coefficients of SIDummy and INTERACT, it is clear that BL is over
two times more sensitive (we compute this by dividing the coefficient estimate of
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INTERACT by the coefficient estimate of SIDummy) to an increase in SI if the increase
happens subsequent to an increase in firm overvaluation.
1.5.3 Overvaluation, Short Selling, and Board Independence
Our hypothesis 2 states that the impact of short selling will be more pronounced in
firms with independent boards compared to firms with non-independent boards. To test
this hypothesis, we divide our sample into two subsamples - (1) Firms with nonindependent boards and (2) Firms with independent boards. Following Shivdasani and
Yermack (1999), we classify a board as independent if independent directors constitute a
majority of the board. Then, we estimate Eq. (6) separately in these two subsamples. Table
1.3 includes the results which show that INTERACT is significantly positive in firms with
independent boards and insignificant in firms with non-independent boards. Furthermore,
the coefficient estimate of INTERACT in firms with independent boards is higher than in
the entire sample of firms in Table 1.2 (0.016 vs. 0.014).The insignificant coefficient
estimate of INTERACT in firms with non-independent boards may indicate that the agency
costs in poor governance firms (proxied by non-independent boards) may be so high that
shareholders of these firms do not enjoy the benefits of external market feedback in the
form of important adverse information embedded in high short position. These results
support the argument in our second hypothesis.
1.5.4 Characteristics of Overvalued Firms and the Intensity of Short Selling Impact
Hypothesis 3 states that the impact of short selling will be more pronounced in
smaller firms, in firms with low institutional ownership, or in firms with higher R&D. To
test this hypothesis with respect to firm size, we divide our sample into three equal groups,
Low, Medium, and High, based on their Size. Following Arnold et al. (2005), we define
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Size as the logarithmic value of the market value of equity.8 We estimate Eq. (6) in each of
these subsamples of firms separately and report the results in Table 1.4. The results show
that the coefficient estimate of INTERACT is positive and strongly significant in each Size
group; however, the coefficient estimate of INTERACT is the highest in the Low Size
group. The coefficient estimates of INTERACT are 0.019, 0.009, and 0.01 in Low, Medium,
and High Size groups, respectively. The coefficient estimate of INTERACT in the smallest
firms (Low Size group) is almost twice the estimate in the largest (High Size group) firms.
Therefore, these results suggest that the impact of short selling on BL is stronger in the
group of smaller firms which is also consistent with the argument in the past studies that
smaller firms are subject to an increased likelihood of misvaluation.
To test hypothesis 3 with respect to institutional ownership, we divide the entire
sample into Low, Medium, and High institutional ownership firms based on the percent of
institutional ownership. Following existing studies (see, e.g., Nagel, 2004; Dechow et al.,
2001), we define institutional ownership as the total number of shares held by institutions
divided by the number of shares outstanding measured at the fiscal year-end. We estimate
Eq. (6) in each of these subsamples of firms separately and report the results in Table 1.5.
The results show that the coefficient estimate of INTERACT is positive and strongly
significant in Low and Medium institutional ownership groups and insignificant in High
institutional ownership group, providing good evidence in support of our hypothesis. The
coefficient estimates of INTERACT are 0.022, 0.024, and 0.005 in Low, Medium, and High
institutional ownership groups, respectively.

8

We obtain similar results by using other measures of Size including the logarithmic value of fiscal year-end
total assets following Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012).
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We follow the same process for R&D expenses (R&D). Specifically, we construct
Low, Medium, and High R&D samples of firms based on R&D, where R&D is defined as
total research and development expenses divided by net sales. However, given the earlier
findings that the impact of short selling is more pronounced among smaller firms, we create
Low, Medium, and High R&D samples from only the High Size firms to avoid the effect
of R&D to be confounded with the Size effect. We estimate Eq. (6) in each of these
subsamples of firms separately and present the results in Table 1.6. The results show that
the coefficient estimate of INTERACT is significantly positive only in High R&D firms.
Specifically, the coefficient estimate of INTERACT is 0.017 in High R&D firms which is
larger than the estimate from the entire sample in Table 1.2 (0.014), indicating that the
short selling impact is driven by firms with high R&D.
1.6 Robustness
Existing studies vary in their approaches to define leverage. For example, previous
studies differ in how they define debt. In our paper, we have defined debt as the sum of
long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. We do not use total liabilities as items like
accounts payable are used for transaction purposes rather than for financing (see, e.g.,
Hovakimian 2006; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Leary and Roberts, 2005). However, other
studies use total liabilities (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002) as debt in their definitions
of leverage. Therefore, in this section, to check the robustness of our results to alternative
definitions of leverage, we use total liabilities as debt in both book and market leverage
and estimate Eq. (6). Table 1.7 includes the results of book leverage which show that
INTERACT is positive and strongly significant. Furthermore, the estimates are very close
to what we obtained previously in Table 1.2 (0.013 vs. 0.014).
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1.7 Conclusion
Overvalued equity provides an opportunity to raise capital in a cost-effective
manner. Past studies find evidence that managers tend to issue shares at high prices and
repurchase shares at low prices (e.g., Marsh, 1982; Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998;
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). However, if an
overvalued firm issues equity by timing the equity market, then this firm may lose value
as the new capital will go into sub-optimal projects or stay as excess cash. Drawing on the
evidence of short selling literature that short sellers are able to identify overvalued firms
(e.g., Seneca, 1967; Figlewski, 1981; Senchack and Starks, 1993; Asquith and Muelbrook,
1996; Desai et al., 2002), we hypothesize that short selling, by revealing adverse
information about future projects, will discourage managers from pursuing over-optimistic
projects which will reduce equity market timing and increase leverage. We test this
hypothesis with a measure of misvaluation based on value-to-price (VP), where value is a
forward-looking measure of firm fundamental value and therefore, control for the growth
effects reasonably well and isolate the effects of overvaluation. The results show that
leverage increases in response to an increase in short selling conditional on an increase in
overvaluation, as our hypothesis suggests. This moderating effect of short selling is
significantly positive among firms with independent boards and insignificant among firms
with non-independent boards, which suggests that board independence facilitates the
incorporation of short sellers’ important adverse information in managerial decision
making. In consistence with existing studies that firm size, R&D expenses, and shortselling constraints can affect the likelihood of equity misvaluation, our results further show
that the moderating effect of short selling is more pronounced in smaller firms, in firms
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with lower institutional ownership, and in firms with higher R&D. Overall, these results
suggest that short selling has an offsetting impact on equity market timing for overvalued
firms, leading to an increase in leverage. These results do not depend on the definitions of
leverage.
Our study examines managerial financing decisions in the presence of short sellers.
The results of our study contribute to a better understanding of corporate financing
decisions and hold implications for policy makers, managers, shareholders, and academics.
The findings that short selling reduces equity market timing of an overvalued firm and thus
potentially reduces investment in suboptimal projects indicate important check and
balances in the financial markets coming from short selling. Policymakers should consider
this market-based disciplinary mechanism of short selling while evaluating any existing or
future regulations affecting short selling. The results of this study are particularly important
for managers. The results support the argument that high short selling is embedded with
important adverse information about firm prospects and that it is important for managers
to incorporate this information into their decision making. This study also encourages
shareholders to ensure an independent board so that the important adverse information
coming from short selling is effectively incorporated into management decision making.
Finally, the interesting results of this study are expected to motivate further academic
research linking capital structure to other branches of literature including short selling and
governance.
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of our dependent and independent variables, and
Panel B shows the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients. BL is book leverage; ML is market
leverage; SI is the short interest; ∆SI is changes in short interest; VP is value-to-price; MB
is market-to-book ratio; PPE is property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before
interest, taxes, and depreciation; SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development
expenses, and Size is firm size. The Appendix includes the detailed definitions of all these
variables. The sources of the data are Compustat and CRSP. The sample period is from the
fiscal year 1974 to 2014 and contains 26,270 firm-year observations. Statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
BL
ML
SI
∆SI
VP
MB
PPE
EBITD
SE
R&D
Size

Mean
0.213
0.162
0.035
(0.018)
0.495
1.735
0.299
0.137
0.243
0.041
6.775

Std. Dev.
0.168
0.152
0.048
1.045
0.498
1.009
0.218
0.095
0.217
0.336
1.655

25 P
0.068
0.036
0.004
(0.247)
0.244
1.108
0.129
0.090
0.115
5.607

50 P
0.202
0.130
0.017
(0.007)
0.456
1.428
0.250
0.136
0.201
0.003
6.717

75 P
0.319
0.243
0.046
0.208
0.662
2.001
0.417
0.187
0.317
0.035
7.880

Panel B: Pearson’s Correlation
BL
ML
SI
∆SI
VP
MB
PPE
EBIT
ML 0.89 ***
D
SI
0.08 *** 0.08 ***
∆SI 0.02 *** 0.01 ** 0.35 ***
VP 0.12 *** 0.19 *** -0.01 ** 0.01 **
MB -0.23 *** -0.40 *** 0.07 *** 0.01
-0.21 ***
PPE 0.31 *** 0.29 *** 0.00
0.00
0.01 *
-0.13 ***
EBITD -0.04 *** -0.15 *** -0.01
0.03 *** 0.07 *** 0.36 *** 0.19 ***
SE -0.21 *** -0.24 *** 0.03 *** -0.01
-0.19 *** 0.25 *** -0.32 *** -0.35 ***
R&D -0.07 *** -0.07 *** 0.02 *** 0.00
-0.08 *** 0.08 *** -0.09 *** -0.21 ***
Size 0.21 *** 0.10 *** 0.04 *** 0.00
0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.11 *** 0.27 ***
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Table 1.2 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage on various explanatory variables.
BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a dummy variable coded one when
changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in short interest; SIDummy is a dummy
variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; MB is the market-to-book ratio;
INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, ∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; PPE is the
property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation;
SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development expenses; R&DDummy is a
dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, else zero, and Size is firm
size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. t- Statistics are reported in
brackets. Two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗, respectively.
Explanatory Variables
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Industry FE

BL
0.014
[5.14]***
-0.002
[-2.15]**
0.006
[3.85]***
-0.007
[-3.52]***
-0.017
[-7.61]***
0.145
[7.24]***
-0.233
[-8.98]***
-0.057
[-4.06]***
0.002
[0.75]
0.021
[2.80]***
0.021
[8.05]***
0.100
[5.49]***
26,270
0.351
YES
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Table 1.3 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage and Board Independence
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage on various explanatory variables.
BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a dummy variable coded one when
changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in short interest; SIDummy is a dummy
variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; MB is the market-to-book ratio;
INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, ∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; PPE is the
property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation;
SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development expenses; R&DDummy is a
dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, else zero, and Size is firm
size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. t- Statistics are reported in
brackets. Two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗, respectively.
Explanatory
Variables
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Industry FE

Dependent Variable: BL
Non-Independent Board
Independent Board
-0.015
0.016
[-1.15]
[2.83]***
0.007
-0.002
[1.99]**
[-0.75]
0.000
0.011
[0.01]
[4.26]***
-0.007
-0.007
[-1.07]
[-2.82]***
-0.015
-0.015
[-1.60]
[-4.85]***
0.112
0.110
[1.68]*
[3.47]***
-0.320
-0.172
[-2.39]**
[-3.70]***
-0.182
-0.015
[-1.51]
[-0.39]
-0.354
-0.019
[-0.96]
[-0.97]
0.022
0.024
[0.90]
[1.89]*
0.022
0.020
[1.71]*
[4.66]***
0.083
0.045
[0.80]
[1.38]
1,331
0.619
YES
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10,214
0.402
YES

Table 1.4 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage and Firm Size
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage in Low, Medium, and High firm
size groups. BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a dummy variable
coded one when changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in short interest;
SIDummy is a dummy variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; MB is the marketto-book ratio; INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, ∆SIDummy, and ∆SI;
PPE is the property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before interest, taxes, and
depreciation; SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development expenses;
R&DDummy is a dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, else zero,
and Size is firm size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. Two-sided
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Explanatory
Variables
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Industry FE

Dependent Variable: BL
Low
Medium
High
0.019
0.009
0.010
[2.58]**
[3.10]***
[2.08]**
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
[-0.64]
[-1.17]
[-1.22]
0.001
0.011
0.009
[0.30]
[3.25]***
[4.24]***
-0.004
-0.010
-0.006
[-0.97]
[-3.68]***
[-2.51]**
-0.025
-0.020
-0.006
[-5.05]***
[-5.08]***
[-2.40]**
0.235
0.152
0.074
[5.71]***
[4.76]***
[2.86]***
-0.062
-0.276
-0.373
[-1.82]*
[-6.30]***
[-9.90]***
0.002
-0.034
-0.013
[0.12]
[-1.51]
[-0.27]
0.004
0.001
-0.045
[2.03]**
[0.32]
[-1.00]
0.009
0.018
0.015
[0.64]
[1.72]*
[1.34]
0.043
0.038
0.016
[8.20]***
[8.72]***
[3.17]***
0.092
0.030
0.067
[2.87]***
[0.91]
[1.24]
6,275
0.466
YES
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9,322
0.430
YES

10,672
0.387
YES

Table 1.5 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage and Institutional Ownership
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage in Low, Medium, and High
institutional ownership firms. BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a
dummy variable coded one when changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in
short interest; SIDummy is a dummy variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero;
MB is the market-to-book ratio; INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy,
∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; PPE is the property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before
interest, taxes, and depreciation; SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development
expenses; R&DDummy is a dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses,
else zero, and Size is firm size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014.
Two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗,
respectively.
Explanatory
Variables
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Industry FE

Dependent Variable: BL
Low
Medium
High
0.022
0.024
0.005
[3.50]***
[4.66]***
[1.09]
-0.006
-0.005
0.005
[-2.06]**
[-2.34]**
[2.85]***
0.001
0.006
0.006
[0.20]
[1.85]*
[2.06]**
-0.007
-0.007
-0.005
[-1.54]
[-2.62]***
[-1.85]*
-0.021
-0.018
-0.014
[-6.89]***
[-5.67]***
[-3.34]***
0.213
0.142
0.098
[6.35]***
[4.63]***
[3.07]***
-0.193
-0.206
-0.254
[-5.20]***
[-5.59]***
[-5.42]***
-0.041
-0.042
-0.062
[-1.81]*
[-2.66]***
[-1.74]*
0.010
-0.001
-0.001
[2.59]***
[-0.41]
[-0.15]
0.016
0.031
0.019
[1.01]
[3.13]***
[1.71]*
0.029
0.023
0.015
[9.87]***
[5.56]***
[3.61]***
0.139
0.036
0.120
[5.89]***
[1.26]
[3.06]***
6,072
0.474
YES
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8,907
0.399
YES

9,180
0.399
YES

Table 1.6 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage and R&D
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage in Low, Medium, and High R&D
firms. BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a dummy variable coded
one when changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in short interest; SIDummy
is a dummy variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; MB is the market-to-book
ratio; INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, ∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; PPE is
the property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation;
SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development expenses; R&DDummy is a
dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, else zero, and Size is firm
size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. Two-sided statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Explanatory
Variables
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Industry FE

Dependent Variable: BL
Low
Medium
High
0.006
0.019
0.017
[1.07]
[1.57]
[1.99]**
-0.004
-0.005
0.000
[-1.54]
[-1.08]
[0.03]
0.016
0.006
0.005
[4.41]***
[1.66]*
[1.23]
-0.012
-0.008
-0.001
[-3.45]***
[-2.01]**
[-0.35]
-0.004
0.018
-0.010
[-1.05]
[1.96]*
[-3.16]***
0.117
0.019
0.036
[2.88]***
[0.30]
[0.92]
-0.417
-0.490
-0.305
[-9.11]***
[-5.81]***
[-3.73]***
0.003
0.216
-0.097
[0.06]
[1.92]*
[-1.06]
35.748
1.663
0.053
[13.15]***
[1.21]
[1.28]
0.129
0.044
[4.93]***
[0.48]
0.014
0.021
0.013
[1.68]*
[2.30]**
[2.03]**
0.175
0.041
0.113
[2.45]**
[0.53]
[1.37]
4,354
0.494
YES
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2,430
0.419
YES

3,888
0.298
YES

Table 1.7 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage (Total Liabilities)
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage on various explanatory variables.
BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a dummy variable coded one when
changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in short interest; SIDummy is a dummy
variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; MB is the market-to-book ratio;
INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, ∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; PPE is the
property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation;
SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development expenses; R&DDummy is a
dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, else zero, and Size is firm
size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. Two-sided statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Explanatory Variables
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1

BL
0.013
[5.31]***
-0.001
[-1.10]
0.004
[2.21]**
-0.009
[-4.79]***
-0.010
[-3.61]***
0.132
[5.55]***
-0.406
[-13.27]***
-0.059
[-3.22]***
0.012
[2.25]**
-0.003
[-0.36]
0.045
[14.91]***
0.237
[11.08]***

∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Industry FE

26,270
0.398
YES
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CHAPTER 2: DOES BOARD INDEPENDENCE REDUCE INFORMED SHORT
SELLING PRIOR TO EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS?
2.1 Introduction
Short sellers are considered sophisticated investors. Financial theory suggests that
short positions should bear a negative relation with stock returns (e.g., Diamond and
Verrecchia, 1987). Empirically, the prior literature provides ample evidence that short
sellers are generally successful in identifying securities that underperform the market
(Asquith and Meulbroek, 1996; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran, 2002).
Past studies also document evidence that short sellers use information in various predictor
variables when taking short positions (Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001;
Drake, Rees, and Swanson, 2011). Other studies argue that short sellers’ ability in
identifying stocks that underperform in the future can be partially attributed to their
possession of private information. For example, Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004)
examine short selling prior to earnings announcements of Nasdaq-listed firms and show
that the pre-announcement short selling mostly appears to be driven by information specific
to the upcoming announcements of the individual firms. Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012)
investigate the relation between organization structure and the information content of short
sales and find that the informed trading via short sales occurs more readily in family firms
than in nonfamily firms. These researchers argue that family owners have access to
privileged information and may seek to earn profits in light of adverse information.
Alternatively, family firms may have a variety of linkages that could facilitate the leakage
of material nonpublic information leading to informed trading prior to earnings
announcements.
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In light of the above substantial evidence that short sellers are informed traders, and
may use privately acquired information in selling short prior to earnings announcement
events, an obvious question arises about the effectiveness of corporate boards in protecting
the shareholders from the exploitation of short sellers around these events through their
access to nonpublic information9. Specifically, the board of directors has the fiduciary
responsibility to uphold the best interests of the shareholders which requires maintaining
an effective information environment surrounding important corporate events like earnings
announcements so that informed traders cannot make abnormal returns at the expense of
uninformed traders by trading with nonpublic information. Therefore, it is important to
examine how corporate boards are impacting short selling behavior driven by possession
of nonpublic information which is the focus of this study. With the evidence that
independent directors are effective monitors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988;
Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010; Byrd and Hickman, 1992), in this paper, we argue that access
to nonpublic information will be limited in firms with independent boards which will
reduce informed short selling prior to upcoming earnings announcements. Existing
literature suggests that board leadership structure may affect the value of board’s
monitoring activities. For example, Desai, Kroll, and Wright (2003) note that shareholders
benefit from the monitoring by independent directors in the presence of CEO duality (when
the titles of both the CEO and the Chairman of the Board are assigned to the same

9

Some studies have referred to information not reflected in publicly available data as private information
(Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004; Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao, 2012). However, we choose to use nonpublic
over private for two reasons; (1) it may be very difficult to isolate private information by a limited set of
control variables and (2) short sellers conduct extensive research on firms they target. Therefore, they may
have access to some information which is not necessarily obtained through private channels but possibly
through their research. Hence, the nonpublic information in this paper refers to information that is available
to short sellers either because they have superior research ability or access to private channels.
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individual). Therefore, our second hypothesis argues that board independence is more
effective in limiting informed short selling in the presence of CEO duality. Finally, because
board size can affect the effectiveness of board’s monitoring activities, favorably or
unfavorably, our third hypothesis argues that the value of board independence in limiting
informed short selling varies with board size.
In this paper, we are interested in examining informed short selling based on
nonpublic information. Therefore, we first estimate measures of abnormal short selling
(ABSI) and unexpected quarterly earnings (UQE). We estimate ABSI prior to earnings
announcements following Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) and estimate UQE, which
cannot be readily attributed to publicly available information, following Anderson, Reeb,
and Zhao (2012). To measure informed short selling, we construct a dummy variable
Prediction, which is coded one when ABSI is positive and UQE is negative, and zero
otherwise, and thus captures when short sellers trade in the right direction relative to
movement of UQE post-announcement. Following Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), we
construct a dummy variable IndependentBoards, which is coded one if independent
directors constitute a majority of the board and zero otherwise. We employ Logistic model
to regress Prediction on IndependentBoards after controlling for UQE and several control
variables that past literature finds to be reliable determinants of short selling. The results
show that the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and significant, which
suggests that informed short selling decreases in firms with independent boards relative to
firms with non-independent boards, providing support for our first hypothesis. More
specifically, the exponentiated coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards, 𝑒 −0.185 = 0.83,
suggests that the predicted odds of correctly predicting the movement of UQE post31

announcement in firms with independent boards is 0.83 times that in firms with nonindependent boards. To evaluate our second hypothesis, we divide our sample into two
subsamples; (1) one subsample includes the observations with CEO duality (2) the other
subsample includes the observations without CEO duality. The results from estimating our
model in the above two subsamples separately show that the coefficient estimate of
IndependentBoards is negative and significant where CEO duality is present and
insignificant where CEO duality is absent, providing support for our second hypothesis. In
the subsample of firms with CEO duality, the exponentiated coefficient estimate of
IndependentBoards, 𝑒 −0.292 = 0.74, suggests that the predicted odds of correctly
predicting the movement of UQE post-announcement in firms with independent boards is
0.74 times that in firms with non-independent boards. Moreover, the magnitude of the
coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards in the subsample with CEO duality is larger
than that in the entire sample (-0.292 versus -0.185). We evaluate our third hypothesis by
estimating our model separately in two subsamples constructed based on board size; (1)
one subsample includes the observations where the board size is small (2) the other
subsample includes the observations where the board size is large. We define board size as
small if the size of a board is less than the median board size and large, otherwise. The
results show that the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and significant
in firms with large boards and insignificant in firms with small board, suggesting that board
independence is more effective in large boards to limit informed short selling prior to
earnings announcement. In the subsample of firms with large boards, the exponentiated
coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards, 𝑒 −0.343 = 0.71, means that the predicted odds
of correctly predicting the movement of UQE post-announcement in firms with
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independent boards is 0.71 times that in firms with non-independent boards. Furthermore,
the magnitude of the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards in the subsample with
large board is almost twice that in the entire sample (-0.343 versus -0.185).
In our analysis, we have used a set of well known control variables that affect short
selling to examine how board independence affects informed short selling. However, the
board of directors is determined endogenously and the above documented negative
relationship between Prediction and IndependentBoards may be driven by unobservable
variables affecting both short selling and board independence. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX, hereafter) provides us an excellent opportunity to deal with this issue by
introducing an exogenous shock to the extent of representation of independent directors in
corporate boards (see e.g., Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010).
Our analysis shows that informed short selling significantly decreased in firms where the
independent directors constituted the majority of the boards after the shock. More
specifically, the exponentiated coefficient estimate of Treatment * PostSOX, an interaction
term between Treatment and PostSOX identifing the firms where independent directors
constituted the majority of the boards after the shock, 𝑒 −0.483 = 0.62, means that the
predicted odds of correctly predicting the movement of UQE post-announcement after the
shock is 0.62 times that before the shock. These results provide reasonable evidence for
our central prediction that independent directors limit informed short selling prior to
upcoming earnings announcements.
Our study contributes to both governance and short selling literature by examining
one of the most important aspects of corporate governance – board independence—within
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the context of short selling. On one hand, past governance studies have thoroughly
examined the relations of board independence with firm value (e.g., Nguyen and Nielsen,
2010), monitoring (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983), agency problems (e.g., Weisbach, 1988;
Byrd and Hickman, 1992), etc. On the other hand, short selling literature has extensively
studied the firm fundamental information (e.g., book-to-market ratio, etc.) that short sellers
consider prior to short selling. However, we have not found any studies that directly
examine if short sellers consider governance-related information, specifically, board
independence, prior to short selling. Thus, our paper contributes to addressing a gap in the
current literature. The results of our studies have implications for policymakers in their
attempt at maintaining transparent financial markets. We also expect our study to lead to
future research in this area which will help gain a better understanding of governance and
short selling.
2.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses
Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) show that short selling prior to quarterly
earnings announcements tends to be driven by information specific to those upcoming
announcements of the individual firms. In examining the relations between organization
structure and the information content of short sales, Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012) find
that family-controlled firms, which may have a variety of linkages that could facilitate the
leakage of material, nonpublic information, are more exposed to informed trading via short
sales. This evidence suggests that some short selling may be driven by possession of
nonpublic information and can adversely affect the shareholders of the firm concerned.
However, an effective corporate governance mechanism is supposed to maintain good
information environment by managing the flow of information from the firm which should
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reduce access to nonpublic information to outsiders such as short sellers. Existing studies
suggest that the presence of independent directors in corporate boards contribute to
effective governance mechanism through their better monitoring of management,
expertise, etc. For example, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that most independent directors
are managers or decision makers at other organizations and they use their directorships to
signal their value to the market. Therefore, they have good incentives to provide good
monitoring of the management and establish their reputations. Subsequent studies also
provide substantial evidence that independent directors are better monitors of management.
For example, Weisbach (1988) find that CEO resignations for poor performance are more
likely in companies with outsider-dominated boards than for companies with insiderdominated boards. Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that independent directors monitor firm
decisions on behalf of shareholders during acquisition process. Alleviating the endogeneity
concerns related to appointment and composition of the board of directors, Nguyen and
Nielsen (2010) examines stock price reactions to sudden deaths of directors and note that
following director death stock prices drop by 0.85% on average, suggesting that
independent directors provide a valuable service to shareholders. The above evidence leads
to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Independent directors limit informed short selling prior to upcoming
earnings announcements.
Board leadership structure may affect the value of board’s monitoring activities.
One aspect of board leadership structure that has gained immense attention in the
governance literature is the assigning of the titles of both the CEO and the Chairman of the
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Board to the same individual, an issue commonly referred to as CEO duality. For example,
Jensen (1993) argues that the CEO cannot perform the critical functions of the Chairman,
which include overseeing the process of hiring, compensating, evaluating, and firing of the
CEO, without personal interest. In consistence with this argument, Desai, Kroll, and Wright
(2003) note that shareholders benefit from the monitoring by independent directors in the
presence of CEO duality. Specifically, they find that the percentage of independent
directors are positively related to firms’ acquisition performance in the presence of CEO
duality and negatively related in the absence of CEO duality. This leads to our second
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The value of board independence in limiting informed short selling
is more pronounced in firms with CEO duality.
Existing studies argue that board size affect board’s monitoring activities and thus,
the information environment. However, these studies provide opposite arguments and
evidence. For example, Klein (2002) find that audit committee independence and board
size are positively correlated. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) argue that larger boards
may increase the level of managerial monitoring and enhance the financial accounting
process. However, studies arguing for smaller boards point to the potential difficulties in
ensuring the quality of board’s monitoring of the management, particularly, of the CEO, in
a large board. For example, Jensen (1993) argue that it is easy for the CEO to take control
of a large board. Yermack (1995) documents an inverse relationship between board size
and firm value and suggests that small boards of directors are more effective. This leads to
our third hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 3. The value of board independence in limiting informed short selling
varies with board size.
2.3 Data
For our analysis, we use monthly/bi-monthly short interest data and quarterly
fundamental data from Compustat, and market data including price, returns, trading
volume, etc. from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and director
characteristics data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Our sample spans from
1996 to 2014 but excludes 2007 through 2009 to remove financial crisis period. We limit
our analysis to the U.S common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11). We also exclude
financial services firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and regulated utility firms (SIC codes
4900–4999) from our analysis, which finally gives us a sample of 11,303 firm-quarter
observations.
2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 Measure of Unexpected Quarterly Earnings (UQE)
In this paper, we hypothesize that short seller’s ability to correctly predict quarterly
earnings will be reduced in firms with independent directors. Our hypothesis is based on
the argument that independent directors maintain good information environment which
limits access to nonpublic information by the outsiders, such as short sellers, around
earnings announcements. Because we are focusing on short selling based on nonpublic
information, we first estimate earnings surprises (positive or negative) which cannot be
attributed to publicly available information. Following Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012),
we obtain unexpected quarterly earnings (UQE) for each firm as the residual from the
following regression:
37

𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−1 + 𝛽2 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−4 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−8 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑞

(1)

where i indexes firms; EPS is actual earnings per share of the announcement quarter (q),
the prior quarter (q-1), one year ago (q-4), and two years ago (q-8).
2.4.2 Measure of Abnormal Short Interest (ABSI)
Because we are interested in short selling driven by nonpublic information about
upcoming earnings announcements, we focus on abnormal short selling prior to earnings
announcements defined as pre-announcement short selling divided by non-announcement
short selling, all minus 1. Following Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004), we define preannouncement short selling as shares sold short during the five days preceding the earnings
announcement and non-announcement short selling as the average shares sold short during
the 57 days prior to the five days of the pre-announcement period. Furthermore, following
the convention in short selling literature (Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001;
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Henry, Kisgen, and Wu, 2011;
Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston, 2015), we divide a firm’s monthly/bi-monthly short
interest (SI) by its total shares outstanding to proxy for short selling. Therefore, our
measure of abnormal short interest (ABSI) is expressed as below:
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1) =

𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1)
−1
𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−62 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−6)

(2)

where t indicates the date of earnings announcement for the firm i.
2.4.3 Measure of Informed Short Selling
In this section, we develop a measure of informed short selling prior to earnings
announcements. We construct a dummy variable, Prediction, that captures the movement
of ABSI relative to the movement of UQE. If short sellers are able to predict negative UQE,
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then we expect short selling to increase prior to announcements which imply a positive
ABSI. Therefore, our measure of correct prediction, Prediction, is coded one when ABSI is
positive and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we construct another
dummy variable IndependentBoards, which is coded one if independent directors
constitute a majority of the board and zero otherwise. As per our hypothesis, we expect
Prediction to be negatively correlated with IndependentBoards.
2.4.4 Model Specification and Estimation Procedure
To evaluate our hypothesis, we regress Prediction on IndependentBoards after
controlling for UQE and several control variables that past literature finds to be reliable
determinants of short selling. For example, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2008) show that
short selling tends to be higher for large-cap stocks and high market-to-book ratio. So, we
control for firm size (Size), defined as the natural log of quarter-end total assets (Anderson,
Reeb, and Zhao, 2012), and market-to-book (MB) ratio, defined as the product of shares
outstanding and price divided by the book value of total common equity (Dechow, Hutton,
Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001). Less liquid stocks can be costly for short-sellers (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). So, we control for liquidity (Liquidity) with trading volume measured
as the natural logarithmic value of the daily trading volume averaged across all trading
days in the quarter (Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao, 2012). To control for the short selling
driven by information in transaction data, we use bid-ask spread (Spread), defined as the
daily bid price less the daily ask price, divided by the average of the bid price plus the ask
price (Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao, 2012). Figlewski (1981) shows that short interest is
correlated with the diversity of beliefs. Following Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012), we
control for the diversity of beliefs with the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided
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by the previous quarter-end stock price (Dispersion) and with the standard deviation of
daily stock returns (Vol). Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012) document that stocks listed on
NYSE exhibit less abnormal short sales than stocks listed on other exchanges. Therefore,
we include two dummy variables NasdaqDummy and AmexDummy. NasdaqDummy is
coded one for stocks listed on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise.
AmexDummy is coded one for stocks listed on the American Stock Exchange, and zero
otherwise. Furthermore, we include dummy variables for each of 48 Fama–French industry
to account for industry effects as well as quarter dummy variables to capture time effects
resulting in the below model:
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1)
=

𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈𝑄𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1

+ 𝛿1 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿1 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(3)

where t indexes time and i indexes firm; Prediction and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 are as
defined in the previous section; UQE is unexpected quarterly earnings; IndustryDummy are
dummy variables for each of 48 Fama–French industry classifications; QuarterDummy are
dummy variables for each calendar quarter; X is a vector of firm characteristics that affect
short selling, which includes market-to-book (MB), firm performance (Performance), stock
return volatility (Vol), share turnover (Liquidity), bid-ask spread (Spread), and dummy
variables for stocks listed on the American Stock Exchange (AmexDummy) and on Nasdaq
Stock Market (NasdaqDummy).
In this paper, our objective is to assess whether informed short selling is related to
board independence. We construct a dummy variable to measure informed short selling
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which is used as the dependent variable. Therefore, we choose an estimation method that
allows for this dummy variable as the dependent variable. We omit usual regression
analysis, including linear probability model, because linear functions are inherently
unbounded but probabilities are bounded by zero and one. We choose Logistic regression
because it solves the problems associated with bounded dependent variable. Logistic
regression removes the upper bound by transforming the probability into odds ratio and
removes the lower bound by taking the natural logarithmic value of the odds ratio.
2.4.5 Endogeneity
In the previous section, we have used a set of well known control variables that
affect short selling. However, the board of directors is determined endogenously and
relations between Prediction and IndependentBoards may be driven by unobservable
variables affecting both short selling and board independence. Therefore, we test our
hypothesis by focusing on an exogenous shock to board independence. In particular, we
focus on the exogenous shock to corporate governance environment from the passage of
SOX, which, among other things, has increased representation of independent directors on
corporate boards (e.g., Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010). We
examine how UQE is related to Prediction before and after the passage of SOX. We create
a dummy variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋, which is coded one for years after 2001 and zero otherwise,
and a dummy variable Treatment, which is coded one for a firm with board having less
than 50% independent directors prior to 2002. Therefore, the interaction between these two
variables, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, will capture how Prediction is related to board
independence. We also include the same set of control variables, industry, and time fixed
effects resulting in the following model:
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𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1)
=

𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑈𝑄𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡−1

+ 𝛾2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛾3 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛿1 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿1 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(4)

As per our hypothesis that board independence reduces informed short selling prior
to earnings announcements, we expect 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 to be negatively correlated
with Prediction.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of our dependent and
independent variables. We calculate the statistics after winsorizing the variables at the 1st
and 99th percentiles within each calendar quarter to mitigate the impact of outliers. The
statistics of the variables in our study are close to the statistics reported in the comparable
studies. For example, the mean values of Size, Liquidity, and Spread are 7.77, 13.34, and
0.03, respectively, which compare closely to 7.69, 13.39, and 0.04, the mean values of
Firm Size, Trading Volume, and Spread, respectively, in Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012).
Panel B shows the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients among the variables in our
study. Our measure of abnormal short selling, ABSI, is positively correlated with
Performance and negatively correlated with Vol, Dispersion, Liquidity, and Spread. UQE
is positively correlated with both Performance and Liquidity and negatively correlated with
Vol, Dispersion, and Spread.
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2.5.2 Informed Short Selling and Board Independence
Our analysis starts with examining the relations between Prediction and
IndependentBoards after controlling for UQE and various determinants of short selling as
per existing literature. Therefore, we estimate equation (3) in the entire sample and present
the results in Table 2.2. The results show that the coefficient estimate of
IndependentBoards is negative and significant. Because IndependentBoards is a dummy
variable coded one if independent directors constitute a majority of the board and zero
otherwise, the above evidence suggests that short sellers’ correct prediction of the direction
of UQE post-announcement decreases in firms with independent boards relative to firms
with non-independent boards, providing support for our first hypothesis. The
interpretations of the coefficient estimates in Logistic regression are not as direct as in OLS
regression. Logistic regression models the log odds of a positive response (in this case, the
probability of correct prediction of the movement of UQE post-announcement) as a linear
combination of the predictor variables. Therefore, for a one unit change in one predictor
variable, the difference in log-odds for correct prediction is expected to change by the
respective coefficient, given the other variables in the model are held constant. The
coefficient estimate of -0.185 of IndependentBoards indicates that the difference in logodds is expected to be 0.185 units lower in firms with independent boards compared to
firms with non-independent boards, while holding the other variables constant in the
model. We can also interpret the results in terms of odds-ratio by exponentiating the
coefficient estimate, 𝑒 −0.185 = 0.83, which means that the predicted odds of correctly
predicting the movement of UQE post-announcement in firms with independent boards is
0.83 times that in firms with non-independent boards.
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2.5.3 Informed Short Selling, Board Independence, and CEO Duality
In our second hypothesis, drawing from the evidence of existing literature that
shareholders benefit from the monitoring by independent directors in the presence of CEO
duality, we argue that the value of board independence in limiting informed short selling
based on nonpublic information is more pronounced in firms with CEO duality. To
evaluate this hypothesis, we divide our sample into two subsamples; (1) one subsample
includes the observations with CEO duality (2) the other subsample includes the
observations without CEO duality. We then estimate equation (3) with Logistic regression
in the above two subsamples separately. Table 2.3 includes the results which show that the
coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and significant where CEO duality
is present and insignificant where CEO duality is absent, providing support for our second
hypothesis. The coefficient estimate of -0.292 of IndependentBoards indicates that the
difference in log-odds is expected to be 0.292 units lower in firms with independent boards
compared to firms with non-independent boards, while holding the other variables constant
in the model. In terms of odds-ratio, the exponentiated coefficient estimate, 𝑒 −0.292 = 0.74,
means that the predicted odds of correctly predicting the movement of UQE postannouncement in firms with independent boards is 0.74 times that in firms with nonindependent boards. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate of
IndependentBoards in the subsample with CEO duality is larger than that in the entire
sample (-0.292 versus -0.185). These results suggest that board independence is more
effective in firms with CEO duality than in firms without CEO duality to limit informed
short selling based on nonpublic information prior to earnings announcement.
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2.5.4 Informed Short Selling, Board Independence, and Board Size
In this paper, we point to the evidence in existing literature that increase in board
size may be either beneficial or detrimental for shareholders, which implies that board size
may either increase or decrease the value of board independence. Thus, in our third
hypothesis we argue that the value of board independence in limiting informed short selling
varies with board size. To evaluate this hypothesis, as before, we divide our sample into
two subsamples; (1) one subsample includes the observations where the board size is small
(2) the other subsample includes the observations where the board size is large. We define
board size as small if the size of a board is less than the median board size and large
otherwise. We estimate equation (3) with Logistic regression in the above two subsamples
separately and report the results in Table 2.4. The results show that the coefficient estimate
of IndependentBoards is negative and significant in firms with large boards and
insignificant in firms with small boards, suggesting that board independence is more
effective in large boards to limit informed short selling prior to earnings announcement. In
the subsample of firms with large boards, the coefficient estimate of -0.343 of
IndependentBoards indicates that the difference in log-odds is expected to be 0.343 units
lower in firms with independent boards compared to firms with non-independent boards,
while holding the other variables constant in the model. In terms of odds-ratio, the
exponentiated coefficient estimate, 𝑒 −0.343 = 0.71, means that the predicted odds of
correctly predicting the movement of UQE post-announcement in firms with independent
boards is 0.71 times that in firms with non-independent boards. Furthermore, the magnitude
of the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards in the subsample with large boards is
almost twice that in the entire sample (-0.343 versus -0.185). These results suggest that
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board independence is more effective in firms with large boards to limit informed short
selling based on nonpublic information prior to earnings announcement.
2.5.5 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Board Independence, and Informed Short Selling
In this section, we discuss the results of using the exogenous shock to representation
of independent directors on corporate boards from the passage of SOX (see e.g., Linck,
Netter, and Yang, 2008; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010) as a quasi-natural experiment to
analyze how informed short selling is related to board indepenence. The results of this
analysis are reported in Table 2.5. First, the significant positive coefficient of PostSOX,
which is a dummy variable coded one for years after 2001 and zero otherwise, indicates that
informed short selling generally increased during the post-SOX period. Furthermore, the
coefficient of Treatment, which identifies the set of firms having less than 50%
independent directors prior to 2002, is strongly significant and positive indicating that short
sellers generally have better predictive ability in these firms controlling for various firmcharacteristics. Finally, our variable of interest is Treatment * PostSOX, an interaction term
between Treatment and PostSOX. This variable identifies the set of firms (among the entire
set of Treatment firms) that changed from having less than 50% independent directors in
their boards prior to the passage of SOX to having more than 50% independent directors
in their boards after the passage of SOX. The strongly significant negative coefficient of
this variable indicates that informed short selling significantly decreased in firms where
the independent directors constituted the majority of the boards after the shock, controlling
for various firm-characteristics that affect short selling. The coefficient estimate of -0.483
of Treatment * PostSOX indicates that the difference in log-odds is 0.483 units lower after
the shock. In terms of odds-ratio, the exponentiated coefficient estimate, 𝑒 −0.483 = 0.62,
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means that the predicted odds of correctly predicting the movement of UQE postannouncement after the shock is 0.62 times that before the shock. These results provide
reasonable evidence for our central prediction that independent directors limit informed
short selling prior to upcoming earnings announcements.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine whether and how board independence affects informed
short selling based on nonpublic information prior to upcoming earnings announcements.
Drawing on the evidence that independent directors are effective monitors (Fama and
Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010; Byrd and Hickman, 1992), we
argue that access to nonpublic information will be limited within firms having independent
boards which will reduce informed short selling prior to upcoming earnings
announcements. Existing literature suggests that the value of board independence may be
more prominent in the presence of CEO duality, which leads to our second hypothesis that
board independence is more effective in limiting informed short selling in the presence of
CEO duality. Finally, because board size can affect the effectiveness of board’s monitoring
activities, favorably or unfavorably, our third hypothesis posits that the value of board
independence in limiting informed short selling varies with board size. We evaluate our
hypotheses by examining the relations between Prediction, a measure of informed short
selling, and IndependentBoards, a dummy variable coded one if independent directors
constitute a majority of the board and zero otherwise. We emply Logistic model to regress
Prediction on IndependentBoards after controlling for UQE and several control variables
that past literature finds to be reliable determinants of short selling. The results show that
the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and significant, which suggests
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that informed short selling decreases in firms with independent boards relative to firms
with non-independent boards, providing support for our first hypothesis. The results from
estimating our model separately in firms with CEO duality and without CEO duality show
that the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and significant where CEO
duality is present and insignificant where CEO duality is absent, which supports our second
hypothesis. Finally, after estimating our model separately in firms with small boards and
large boards, we find that the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and
significant in firms with large boards and insignificant in firms with small boards,
suggesting that board independence is more effective in large boards to limit informed
short selling prior to earnings announcement. Because the board of directors is determined
endogenously, the above documented negative relationship between Prediction and
IndependentBoards may be driven by unobservable variables affecting both short selling
and board independence. Therefore, we perform a quasi-natural experiment relying on the
exogenous shock to representation of independent directors on corporate boards from the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The results show that informed short selling
significantly decreased in firms where the independent directors constituted the majority
of the boards after the shock.
Our study contributes both to the governance and short selling literature. The
findings that board independence reduces informed short selling driven by nonpublic
information points to an important oversight role performed by the independent directors
of the corporate board. By studying the utility of board independence in the presence of
CEO duality and large boards, this paper helps to clarify when shareholders can expect
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board independence to be more beneficial. Finally, by showing that short selling is sensitive
to board independence, we contribute to a better understanding of short selling.
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of our dependent and independent variables and Panel B shows the Pearson’s Correlation
Coefficients of the variables. ABSI is abnormal short interest; UQE is unexpected quarterly earnings; MB is market-to-book; Size
is firm size; Performance is firm income before extraordinary items; Vol is stock return volatility; Dispersion is dispersion in
analysts’ forecasts; Liquidity is trading volume; Spread is bid-ask spread; The Appendix includes the detailed definitions of all
these variables. The sources of the data are Compustat and CRSP. The sample period is from the calendar year 1996 to 2014 and
contains 11,303 firm-quarter observations.
Variable

Mean

ABSI
UQE
MB
Size
Performance
Vol
Dispersion
Liquidity
Spread

0.009
0.000
3.283
7.769
0.015
0.024
0.002
13.338
0.032

UQE
MB
Size
Performance
Vol
Dispersion
Liquidity
Spread

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Median
Std Dev.
-0.011
0.006
2.307
7.598
0.015
0.021
0.001
13.274
0.029

0.217
0.210
59.726
1.529
0.023
0.012
0.003
1.486
0.015

25th
Percentile
-0.109
-0.068
1.520
6.651
0.006
0.016
0.000
12.264
0.022

75th
Percentile
0.097
0.074
3.665
8.780
0.026
0.029
0.002
14.415
0.038

Panel B: Pearson’s Correlation
ABSI
UQE
MB
Size Performance
Vol
Dispersion Liquidity
-0.010
0.000
-0.007
-0.001
0.014
-0.013
0.025*** 0.374*** -0.012 0.041***
-0.034*** -0.098*** 0.012 -0.295***
-0.249***
-0.022** -0.119*** -0.002 -0.089***
-0.375*** 0.396***
-0.021** 0.017*
0.010 0.712***
0.068*** 0.006
0.003
-0.037*** -0.097*** 0.012 -0.309***
-0.270*** 0.933***
0.420*** 0.020***
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Table 2.2 Informed Short Selling and Board Independence
This table shows the results of regressing Prediction on IndependentBoards controlling for
various determinants of short selling using Logistic analytical method. Prediction is a
dummy variable coded one when ABSI is positive and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise.
ABSI is abnormal short selling; UQE is unexpected quarterly earnings; IndependentBoards
is a dummy variable coded one if independent directors constitute a majority of the board
and zero otherwise; MB is market-to-book; Size is firm size; Performance is firm income
before extraordinary items; Vol is stock return volatility; Dispersion is dispersion in
analysts’ forecasts; Liquidity is trading volume; Spread is bid-ask spread; AmexDummy is
a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the American Stock Exchange, and zero
otherwise; NasdaqDummy is a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the Nasdaq
Stock Market, and zero otherwise. The Appendix includes the detailed definitions of all
these variables. The sources of the data are Compustat and CRSP. The sample period is
from the calendar year 1996 to 2014. t- Statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using the Huber–White sandwich estimator
(clustered on firm-level identifier) and are reported in brackets. Two-sided statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Prediction
Explanatory Variables
Coefficients
IndependentBoards
-0.185
[-2.26]**
UQE
-5.643
[-17.25]***
MB
-0.000
[-0.52]
Size
-0.193
[-4.74]***
Performance
-6.807
[-4.73]***
Vol
-9.761
[-1.45]
Dispersion
-12.700
[-0.98]
Liquidity
0.124
[3.32]***
Spread
-9.964
[-1.65]*
AmexDummy
-0.948
[-1.31]
NasdaqDummy
-0.025
[-0.33]
Constant
-2.189
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[-4.41]***
Observations
Industry FE
Quarter FE
Pseudo 𝑅 2

11,303
YES
YES
0.173

52

Table 2.3 Informed Short Selling, Board Independence, and CEO Duality
This table shows the results of regressing Prediction on IndependentBoards controlling for
various determinants of short selling using Logistic analytical method. Prediction is a
dummy variable coded one when ABSI is positive and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise.
ABSI is abnormal short selling; UQE is unexpected quarterly earnings; IndependentBoards
is a dummy variable coded one if independent directors constitute a majority of the board
and zero otherwise; MB is market-to-book; Size is firm size; Performance is firm income
before extraordinary items; Vol is stock return volatility; Dispersion is dispersion in
analysts’ forecasts; Liquidity is trading volume; Spread is bid-ask spread; AmexDummy is
a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the American Stock Exchange, and zero
otherwise; NasdaqDummy is a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the Nasdaq
Stock Market, and zero otherwise. CEO duality exists when the titles of both the CEO and
the Chairman of the Board are assigned to the same individual. The Appendix includes the
detailed definitions of all these variables. The sources of the data are Compustat and CRSP.
The sample period is from the calendar year 1996 to 2014. t- Statistics are based on
standard errors adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using the Huber–
White sandwich estimator (clustered on firm-level identifier) and are reported in brackets.
Two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗,
respectively.
Dependent Variable: Prediction
Explanatory
Coefficients
Variables
With CEO Duality Without CEO Duality
IndependentBoards
-0.292
0.012
[-2.82]***
[0.08]
UQE
-5.868
-5.431
[-13.79]***
[-11.59]***
MB
-0.000
-0.002
[-0.41]
[-0.91]
Size
-0.188
-0.169
[-3.48]***
[-2.67]***
Performance
-3.565
-10.353
[-1.55]
[-5.27]***
Vol
-7.863
-15.680
[-0.89]
[-1.51]
Dispersion
3.772
-30.501
[0.23]
[-1.66]*
Liquidity
0.080
0.168
[1.59]
[3.02]***
Spread
-14.756
-3.479
[-1.77]*
[-0.39]
AmexDummy
-0.323
[-0.50]
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NasdaqDummy
Constant

Observations
Industry FE
Quarter FE
Pseudo 𝑅 2

0.097
[0.91]
-1.507
[-2.60]***

-0.148
[-1.36]
-1.675
[-2.55]**

6,639
YES
YES
0.182

4,592
YES
YES
0.182
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Table 2.4 Informed Short Selling, Board Independence, and Board Size
This table shows the results of regressing Prediction on IndependentBoards controlling for
various determinants of short selling using Logistic analytical method. Prediction is a
dummy variable coded one when ABSI is positive and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise.
ABSI is abnormal short selling; UQE is unexpected quarterly earnings; IndependentBoards
is a dummy variable coded one if independent directors constitute a majority of the board
and zero otherwise; MB is market-to-book; Size is firm size; Performance is firm income
before extraordinary items; Vol is stock return volatility; Dispersion is dispersion in
analysts’ forecasts; Liquidity is trading volume; Spread is bid-ask spread; AmexDummy is
a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the American Stock Exchange, and zero
otherwise; NasdaqDummy is a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the Nasdaq
Stock Market, and zero otherwise. Firms are considered to have small boards if their board
size is less than the sample median board size of nine members, otherwise they are
considered to have large boards. The Appendix includes the detailed definitions of all these
variables. The sources of the data are Compustat and CRSP. The sample period is from the
calendar year 1996 to 2014. t- Statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity using the Huber–White sandwich estimator (clustered
on firm-level identifier) and are reported in brackets. Two-sided statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Prediction
Explanatory
Coefficients
Variables
Small Board
Large Board
IndependentBoards
-0.042
-0.343
[-0.34]
[-2.94]***
UQE
-6.201
-5.531
[-13.44]***
[-13.32]***
MB
-0.001
0.005
[-1.24]
[2.71]***
Size
-0.238
-0.201
[-3.49]***
[-3.56]***
Performance
-5.726
-8.522
[-2.91]***
[-4.04]***
Vol
0.103
-17.465
[0.01]
[-1.75]*
Dispersion
-21.863
-10.887
[-1.23]
[-0.56]
Liquidity
0.124
0.133
[2.20]**
[2.51]**
Spread
-14.779
-5.039
[-1.67]*
[-0.57]
AmexDummy
-0.654
[-0.89]

55

NasdaqDummy
Constant

0.064
[0.58]
-1.795
[-2.44]**

-0.126
[-1.16]
-2.341
[-3.64]***

4,413
YES
YES
0.184

6,849
YES
YES
0.184

Observations
Industry FE
Quarter FE
Pseudo 𝑅 2
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Table 2.5 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Board Independence, and Informed Short Selling
This table reports the results of the quasi-natural experiment with Logistic analytical
method using the exogenous shock in board independence from the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Prediction is a dummy variable coded one when ABSI
is positive and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise. ABSI is abnormal short selling; UQE
is unexpected quarterly earnings; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋 is a dummy variable coded one for years after
2001 and zero otherwise; Treatment is a dummy variable coded one for a firm with board
having less than 50% independent directors prior to 2002; MB is market-to-book; Size is
firm size; Performance is firm income before extraordinary items; Vol is stock return
volatility; Dispersion is dispersion in analysts’ forecasts; Liquidity is trading volume;
Spread is bid-ask spread; AmexDummy is a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed
on the American Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise; NasdaqDummy is a dummy variable
coded one for a stock listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market, and zero otherwise. The sample
period is from the calendar year 1996 to 2014 and contains 5,345 firm-quarter observations.
t- Statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity using the Huber–White sandwich estimator (clustered on firm-level
identifier) and are reported in brackets. Two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Prediction
Explanatory Variables
Coefficients
UQE
-5.370
[-10.96]***
Treatment x PostSOX
-0.483
[-2.73]***
Treatment
0.509
[3.64]***
PostSOX
0.836
[1.67]*
Size
-0.147
[-2.02]**
Performance
-13.382
[-4.53]***
Vol
-17.158
[-1.66]*
Dispersion
-19.620
[-0.77]
Liquidity
0.052
[0.67]
Spread
1.412
[0.15]
AmexDummy
-0.730
[-1.13]
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NasdaqDummy

0.470
[0.72]
-0.594
[-0.96]

Constant

Observations
Industry FE
Quarter FE
Pseudo 𝑅 2

5,340
YES
YES
0.185
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CHAPTER 3: SHORT POSITIONS AND INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 Introduction
Prior studies document that short sellers are generally successful in identifying
securities that underperform the market (e.g., Seneca, 1967; Figlewski, 1981; Senchack
and Starks, 1993; Asquith and Muelbrook, 1996; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and
Balachandran, 2002; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009). Some of these studies focus on
informed short selling around quarterly earnings announcement and find preannouncement short selling to be significantly related to post-announcement returns (e.g.,
Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004; Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao, 2012; Fang, Huang, and
Karpoff, 2016). In this paper, drawing on the above evidence of informed short selling
around earnings announcement, we provide a methodology that examines preannouncement short selling and provides specific “Sell” recommendations ahead of
earnings announcement. Thus, our study provides an important decision support tool to be
used in conjunction with the traditional investment recommendations of financial analysts.
Recent studies suggest that following sell-side financial analysts’ recommendations blindly
can be costly for investors as these recommendations can be affected by the economic
incentives of these analysts in recommending certain stocks including “growth” stocks, etc.
(e.g.,

Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and

Lee,

2004).

However, the investment

recommendations coming from short selling does not suffer from this potential conflict of
interest as short sellers undertake significant risk in short selling by investing their own
capital (e.g., Drake, Rees, and Swanson, 2011). Furthermore, Drake, Rees, and Swanson
(2011) show that when short sellers and financial analysts disagree in their prediction of
future returns, investing following the short sellers is the most profitable investment
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strategy. Therefore, our study makes a significant contribution by providing a framework
that supports informed decision making.
Our methodology involves examining the short selling of a firm at a point of time
closest to its day of quarterly earnings announcements. Following the convention in the
short selling literature (e.g., Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001; Asquith,
Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Henry, Kisgen, and Wu, 2011; Grullon,
Michenaud, and Weston, 2015), we divide a firm’s monthly/bi-monthly short interest (SI)10
by its total shares outstanding to proxy for short selling. We form quintile portfolios based
on SI on the SI publication date11and make “Sell” recommendations for firms in the quintile
with the highest SI. We evaluate the effectiveness of our methodology by examining the
raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted “Sell” portfolios over a long range of
holding periods, namely from the one-day holding period to the 30-day holding period,
from the day immediately after the earnings announcement. The results show that raw,
excess, and abnormal returns are highly significant up to the 22-day holding period.
Furthermore, the returns are larger negative for longer holding periods. For example, the
one-day and 14-day holding period raw returns are -0.24% and -0.45%, excess returns are
-0.25% and -0.54%, and abnormal returns are -0.14% and -0.48%, respectively. These
returns are economically significant considering the “Sell” portfolios are formed on every
SI publication date which occurs at a frequency of two every month since September 2007.

10

Short interest is the quantity of firm shares that investors have sold short but not yet covered or closed out.

11

Section 4. Methodology discusses the timeline of short interest data and defines SI publication date which
accounts for the lag between a firm’s reporting of short interest data and publication of the data upon
compilation.
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Therefore, focusing on the 14-day holding period, the holding period up to which all returns
seem to decrease (that is, the returns become larger negative) as the holding period
increases, the annualized simple raw returns and abnormal returns are -10.80% and 11.52%. We compute the returns by multiplying the 14-day holding period returns by 24
as there are 24 SI publication dates in a year which mean “Sell” portfolios can also be
formed 24 times in a year. We evaluate the robustness of our results though subsample
analysis which shows that the results are very significant and consistent for the most recent
time in the sample, specifically, from 2010 to 2015, which points to the relevance of our
methodology.
3.2 Literature Review
During the last several years, financial researchers have conducted a critical review
of the value addition from the analysts’ recommendations. Although past studies document
that analysts’ recommendations help price discovery process of financial securities, the
recent empirical evidence on the value of analysts’ recommendation is mixed. For example,
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) find that directly following analysts’
recommendations can be costly as these recommendations are often biased towards
“glamour” (i.e., positive momentum, high growth, high volume, and relatively expensive)
stocks and are not aligned with the expected direction between these variables and future
returns. Lin and McNichols (1998) and Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) attribute this
less than optimal recommendations to the conflict of interest financial analysts face in their
profession. Subsequently, some studies sought after alternative, and hopefully, less-biased,
public sources of information to support investment decision making. For example, Drake,
Rees, and Swanson (2011) compare the investment value from analysts’ recommendations

61

with that from short interest. These researchers find that short interest is significantly
associated in the expected direction with all 11 predictive variables they examine whereas
analysts’ recommendations often violate the expected direction for several variables.
Furthermore, a portfolio of stocks in which short sellers and analysts conflict in their
opinions about future returns can earn high abnormal returns if investors follow the short
sellers.
There is ample empirical evidence that short sellers are informed traders.
Specifically, past studies document evidence that short sellers are able to identify
overvalued firms (e.g., Seneca, 1967; Figlewski, 1981; Senchack and Starks, 1993; Asquith
and Muelbrook, 1996; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran, 2002) and
contribute to price discovery in the financial markets (e.g., Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu,
2007; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Boehmer and Wu, 2013; Saffi and Sigurdsson,
2011). Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find that short sellers appear to take advantage of
short-term overreaction in stock prices. Other studies examine short sellers’ ability in
timing specific corporate events, e.g., quarterly earnings announcement. Christophe, Ferri,
and Angel (2004) examine short selling prior to earnings announcements of Nasdaq-listed
firms and show that the pre-announcement short selling mostly appears to reflect firmspecific information rather than fundamental financial characteristics of firms.
Given substantial past evidence that SI contains valuable information with respect
to future returns, the increased availability of SI data creates a good opportunity for
investors to analyze the short interest data to obtain valuable price-related information and
invest in a more informed manner. However, the process of obtaining SI data, analyzing
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them, understanding the right investment signals, etc., to be able to invest in a more
profitable manner is a very involved and time-consuming one. Moreover, although there
are a lot of studies that suggest trading strategies based on short selling data, these studies
do not provide concise, simplified, and objective investment recommendations for
investors to follow easily, such as following the analysts’ “Buy”, “Sell”, and other similar
recommendations. In this paper, we attempt to provide a methodology to analyze SI data
and come up with investment recommendations such as analysts’ recommendations.
Investors pay attention to analyst recommendations prior to making their
investment decisions. However, these recommendations are often biased and yield less than
optimal results. The major contribution of this paper is to provide a less biased opinion on
future price movement based on short sellers’ trades. We expect our study to initiate similar
research in the future to enrich our understanding of short interest data.
3.3 Data
For our analysis, we use monthly/bi-monthly SI data from Compustat and market
data including price, returns, trading volume, etc., from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). We also obtain the earnings announcement dates from Compustat. For our
sample creation, we go as far back as possible. However, SI data in Compustat are available
only since 1973, and therefore, our initial sample spans from 1973 to 2015. We limit our
analysis to domestic common stock (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) listed on NYSE, Amex,
and Nasdaq resulting in a sample of 235,417 monthly or bimonthly observations. Table 3.1
shows the distribution of quarterly earning announcements into months. We count the
number of announcements in each month of each year and then compute the time series
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average. The results show that the announcements happen each month; however, most of
the announcements happen in February, May, August, and November.
We evaluate the robustness of our analysis after excluding financial services firms
(SIC codes 6000–6999), regulated utility firms (SIC codes 4900–4999), and the financial
crisis period spanning from 2008 to 2009.
3.4 Methodology
Our methodology involves examining the short position of a firm at a point of time
closest to its day of quarterly earnings announcements. Prior to September 2007, SI data
are available only once in a month; as of settlement on the 15th of each month, or the
preceding business day if the 15th is not a business day. However, from September 2007,
SI data are available also as of settlement on the last business day of the month.
Furthermore, it takes a10-14 additional business days form the reporting settlement date to
publish the SI data. Therefore, in our methodology, we identify the set of firms which have
quarterly earnings announcement within the next 15 calendar days after SI data are
published, SI publication date, to conduct our analysis and provide investment
recommendations based on the short selling data available immediately before an earnings
announcement. We form quintile portfolios based on SI on the SI publication date and make
“Sell” recommendations for the firms in the quintile with the highest SI.
We evaluate the effectiveness of our methodology by examining the raw returns,
excess returns, and abnormal returns (Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 2010) of equalweighted “Sell” portfolios. Past studies examine returns over various holding periods in
evaluating the information content in SI in predicting future returns: two-day (Anderson,
Reeb, and Zhao, 2012), three-day (Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and Tice, 2009), and
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one-month (Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 2010). In our study, we evaluate the postannouncement returns for a long range of holding periods, namely from one-day holding
period to 30-day holding period, from the day immediately after the earnings
announcement.
We compute the raw and excess returns of the equal-weighted portfolio consisting
of the firms having “Sell” recommendations ahead of earnings announcements from our
methodology on each SI publication date (once every month for months prior to September
2007 and twice every month since September 2007). Then we aggregate the time series of
the equal-weighted returns and compute the time series average. In case of abnormal
returns, we perform Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of the following fourfactor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997):
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡

(1)

where 𝛼𝑝 captures the abnormal returns, 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the realized market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡
is the excess return of a portfolio of small stocks over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is
the excess return of a portfolio of high book-to-market-value stocks over a portfolio of low
book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 is the excess return on the prior-period winners
portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio. We estimate a separate cross-sectional
regression for each calendar year and calculate time series average of the abnormal returns.
3.5 Results
Table 3.2 shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns for one-day to 30-day
holding period returns of the equal-weighted “Sell” portfolios. The results show that all
returns are highly significant up to the 22-day holding period, whereas abnormal returns
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are significant up to the 30-day holding period. Furthermore, we see larger negative raw,
excess, and abnormal returns as the holding period increases up to the 14-day holding
period. More specifically, the one-day and 14-day holding period raw returns are -0.24%
and -0.45%, excess returns are -0.25% and -0.54%, and abnormal returns are -0.14% and 0.48%, respectively. This pattern is more persistent in case of abnormal returns where
returns generally continue to decrease (become larger negative) up to the 30-day holding
period reaching to -0.67%. These returns are economically highly significant considering
the “Sell” portfolios are formed every SI publication date which occurs at a frequency of
two every month since September 2007. Therefore, if we focus on the 14-day holding
period, the holding period up to which all returns seem to decrease (that is, the returns
become larger negative) as the holding period increases, the annualized simple raw returns
and abnormal returns are -10.78% and -11.4%. We compute the returns by multiplying the
14-day holding period returns by 24, as there are 24 SI publication dates in a year which
means “Sell” portfolios can also be formed 24 times in a year.
To further evaluate the merit of the “Sell” recommendations based on SI, we
perform subsample analysis. Fig. 1 plots the time series of the annual mean SI which
reveals an increasing trend during the sample period. For example, SI has increased from
0.29% in 1973 to 4.64% in 2015. However, SI increased dramatically from 2000 to 2007
when it reached 6.31% before dropping dramatically again. Therefore, for our subsample
analysis, we divide the entire sample into three subsamples; the first subsample spans from
1973 to 1999, the second subsample spans from 2000 to 2007, and the third subsample
spans from 2008 to 2015. Furthermore, we exclude financial services firms (SIC codes
6000 to 6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4999).
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Table 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 show the raw, excess, and abnormal returns for one-day to
30-day holding periods of the equal-weighted “Sell” portfolios for the subsamples of 1973
to 1999, 2000 to 2007, and 2008 to 2015, respectively. In case of the first subsample, from
1973 to 1999, the results are not thoroughly consistent. For example, although both raw
and excess returns are significant for the one-day to the three-day holding period, these
results are positive contrary to our expectation of negative returns. Moreover, abnormal
returns are not significant for any of these holding periods. Furthermore, both raw and
abnormal returns are significant for the five-day to the 11-day holding period. However,
raw returns are positive, whereas abnormal returns are negative. Except for the 9-day
holding period, excess returns are not significant for these holding periods.
In case of the second subsample, from 2000 to 2007, we see the similar
inconsistency in results. For example, Table 3.4 shows that although both raw and excess
returns are significant for each of the holding periods from the one-day to the 21-day
holding period, abnormal returns are significant only for one-day, five-day, seven-day, and
sixteen-day holding periods.
However, turning to the final subsample which covers the most recent time of our
sample, from 2008 to 2015, we see very supportive results for the “Sell” recommendations.
For example, Table 3.5, which reports the results of this subsample, shows that except for
the eight-day holding period, raw, excess, and abnormal returns are highly significant for
each of the holding periods from one-day to 12-day holding periods. Therefore, these
results suggest that our methodology works best for the most recent time in the sample.
The results from the final subsample, from 2008 to 2015, provides good support for
the methodology in the paper. However, this subsample also includes the financial crisis
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period which raises concerns about the applicability of our methodology during a normal
period. Therefore, we need to evaluate if the results from the final subsample are driven by
the financial crisis period. To verify the validity of this concern, we exclude 2008 to 2009
from the final subsample and perform our analysis, the results of which are presented in
Table 3.6. The results show that all returns, raw, excess, and abnormal, are significant for
each of the holding periods from the one-day to the 15-day holding period. Therefore,
exclusion of the financial crisis period, in fact, strengthens the results and provides strong
support for our methodology.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we draw on the well documented evidence of informed short selling
around quarterly earnings announcement, design a methodology that examines the preannouncement short selling, and provide specific “Sell” recommendations for firms ahead
of their earnings announcements. In our methodology, we examine the short position of a
firm at a point of time closest to its day of quarterly earnings announcements. More
specifically, each month we identify the set of firms having the highest SI prior to their
quarterly earnings announcement and make a “Sell” recommendations for these firms. We
evaluate the merit of our methodology by examining the post-announcement raw, excess,
and abnormal returns of the equal-weighted portfolios consisting of firms having the “Sell”
recommendations. We form portfolios for one-day to 30-day holding periods. The initial
results show that all returns are highly significant up to the 22-day holding period, whereas
abnormal returns are significant up to the 30-day holding period. We evaluate the
robustness of our results through subsample analysis which shows that the results are very
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significant and consistent for the most recent time in our sample, specifically, from 2010
to 2015, which points to the relevance of our methodology.
Investors and other market participants heavily rely on the investment
recommendations of financial analysts. However, recent studies suggest that sell-side
financial analysts’ recommendations can be biased because of conflict of interest, etc. Our
study focuses on short sellers who are considered informed investors and who do not suffer
from a conflict of interests such as financial analysts’ and thus provide an alternative source
of information. Investors can take into consideration the “Sell” recommendations of our
methodology along with the traditional investment recommendations of financial analysts.
Therefore, our study makes a significant contribution in helping investors make informed
investment decisions.
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Figure 3.1 Time-series of mean short interest
This Figure shows the time-series of mean short interest (SI). We compute monthly crosssectional mean SI which is then used to compute annual mean SI. The sample period is
from the fiscal year 1973 to 2015.
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Table 3.1 Monthly Distribution of Quarterly Earnings Announcement
Table 1 shows the distribution of quarterly earnings announcements into calendar months.
The number of announcements is computed in each month of each year and the time series
average is reported. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1973 to 2015.
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
All

No. of Announcements
290
661
400
475
769
103
498
713
102
513
705
121
5,350
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% Announcements
5.41
12.35
7.48
8.88
14.36
1.92
9.31
13.33
1.91
9.59
13.17
2.26
100

Table 3.2 Returns of “Sell” Portfolios (1973 to 2015)
This table shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted portfolios
consisting of firms with “Sell” recommendations. Abnormal returns are the intercept from
the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) estimated following
Fama and MacBeth (1973):
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑝𝑡

(1)

where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is excess return of a portfolio of small stocks
over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of a portfolio of high book-tomarket-value stocks over a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 is the
excess return on the prior-period winners portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio.
The data for the factor portfolio returns are from Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS). The sample period is from the fiscal year 1973 to 2015. Two-sided statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The
significance level for the mean is based on t-statistics calculated with Newey-West
autocorrelation-adjusted (3-lags) standard errors.
Days
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Raw Returns
Returns t-stat
-0.238 -24.12***
-0.228
-17.1***
-0.225 -15.57***
-0.284 -17.21***
-0.312 -17.08***
-0.326 -15.06***
-0.316 -12.46***
-0.317 -10.97***
-0.328 -10.35***
-0.374 -10.98***
-0.386 -10.86***
-0.376 -10.08***
-0.403 -10.11***
-0.449 -10.68***
-0.415
-9.32***
-0.355
-7.66***
-0.310
-6.55***
-0.310
-6.48***
-0.299
-6.22***
-0.281
-5.72***
-0.247
-4.82***
-0.176
-3.32***
-0.095
-1.75*

Excess Returns
Abnormal Returns
Returns t-stat
Returns t-stat
-0.247 -25.08*** -0.138
-2.26**
-0.243 -18.29*** -0.130
-1.82*
-0.243 -16.83*** -0.208
-3.14***
-0.306
-18.6*** -0.292
-4.71***
-0.340 -18.65*** -0.329
-4.38***
-0.362 -16.75*** -0.326
-3.78***
-0.361 -14.25*** -0.359
-4.17***
-0.370 -12.81*** -0.385
-4.68***
-0.387
-12.2*** -0.390
-4.56***
-0.437 -12.83*** -0.425
-4.84***
-0.453 -12.78*** -0.452
-5.01***
-0.449 -12.05*** -0.443
-4.42***
-0.484 -12.14*** -0.463
-4.98***
-0.538 -12.82*** -0.475
-5.35***
-0.513 -11.52*** -0.483
-4.89***
-0.458
-9.88*** -0.504
-4.89***
-0.417
-8.8*** -0.531
-4.95***
-0.421
-8.82*** -0.545
-5.17***
-0.416
-8.66*** -0.561
-5.58***
-0.406
-8.25*** -0.560
-5.56***
-0.380
-7.42*** -0.591
-5.85***
-0.317
-5.98*** -0.602
-5.51***
-0.241
-4.45*** -0.612
-5.25***
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24
25
26
27
28
29
30

-0.073
-0.090
-0.097
-0.073
-0.042
0.059
0.116

-1.31
-1.61
-1.72*
-1.29
-0.72
0.99
1.92*

-0.223
-0.245
-0.257
-0.241
-0.219
-0.126
-0.074

73

-4.03***
-4.38***
-4.57***
-4.26***
-3.76***
-2.11**
-1.22

-0.549
-0.526
-0.534
-0.543
-0.637
-0.673
-0.667

-4.94***
-4.54***
-4.26***
-4.25***
-5.27***
-4.92***
-5.43***

Table 3.3 Returns of “Sell” Portfolios (1973 to 1999)
This table shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted portfolios
consisting of firms with “Sell” recommendations. Abnormal returns are the intercept from
the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) estimated following
Fama and MacBeth (1973):
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡

(1)

where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is excess return of a portfolio of small stocks
over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of a portfolio of high book-tomarket-value stocks over a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 is the
excess return on the prior-period winners portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio.
The data for the factor portfolio returns are from Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS). The sample period is from the fiscal year 1973 to 1999. Two-sided statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The
significance level for the mean is based on t-statistics calculated with Newey-West
autocorrelation-adjusted (3-lags) standard errors.
Days
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Raw Returns
Returns t-stat
0.150
7.58***
0.284
10.37***
0.274
9.75***
0.199
6.21***
0.127
3.37***
0.158
3.6***
0.158
3.17***
0.193
3.56***
0.261
4.43***
0.202
3.2***
0.162
2.42**
0.109
1.5
0.059
0.76
0.029
0.35
0.066
0.75
0.120
1.31
0.135
1.43
0.098
1
0.062
0.61
0.079
0.74
0.157
1.39
0.241
2.05**
0.325
2.7***
0.368
2.99***

Excess Returns
Returns t-stat
0.125
6.31***
0.241
8.8***
0.225
8.01***
0.136
4.26***
0.049
1.3
0.059
1.35
0.034
0.68
0.049
0.9
0.102
1.73*
0.030
0.47
-0.024
-0.36
-0.092
-1.27
-0.163
-2.08**
-0.218
-2.62***
-0.201
-2.29**
-0.161
-1.76*
-0.159
-1.68*
-0.210
-2.14**
-0.261
-2.57**
-0.264
-2.47**
-0.210
-1.86*
-0.146
-1.24
-0.076
-0.63
-0.046
-0.37
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Abnormal Returns
Returns t-stat
-0.006
-0.12
0.018
0.26
-0.057
-0.96
-0.153
-2.21**
-0.203
-2.28**
-0.190
-1.81*
-0.267
-2.5**
-0.335
-2.89***
-0.329
-2.75**
-0.383
-3.21***
-0.403
-3.2***
-0.393
-2.77**
-0.408
-3.1***
-0.440
-3.19***
-0.471
-3.11***
-0.494
-3.19***
-0.556
-3.55***
-0.563
-3.9***
-0.565
-4.11***
-0.561
-4.35***
-0.600
-4.53***
-0.597
-3.91***
-0.629
-4.17***
-0.591
-3.87***

25
26
27
28
29
30

0.373
0.397
0.381
0.422
0.500
0.535

2.97***
3.1***
2.91***
3.13***
3.62***
3.85***

-0.054
-0.045
-0.081
-0.065
-0.007
0.013

-0.43
-0.35
-0.62
-0.49
-0.05
0.09
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-0.566
-0.545
-0.503
-0.563
-0.590
-0.596

-3.54***
-3.08***
-2.69**
-3.3***
-3.07***
-3.54***

Table 3.4 Returns of “Sell” Portfolios (2000 to 2007)
This table shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted portfolios
consisting of firms with “Sell” recommendations. Abnormal returns are the intercept from
the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) estimated following
Fama and MacBeth (1973):
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡

(1)

where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is excess return of a portfolio of small stocks
over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of a portfolio of high book-tomarket-value stocks over a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 is the
excess return on the prior-period winners portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio.
The data for the factor portfolio returns are from Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS). The sample period is from the fiscal year 2000 to 2007. Two-sided statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The
significance level for the mean is based on t-statistics calculated with Newey-West
autocorrelation-adjusted (3-lags) standard errors.
Days
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Raw Returns
Returns
t-stat
-0.441
-22.38***
-0.537
-22.02***
-0.623
-23.28***
-0.768
-24.59***
-0.828
-24.45***
-0.854
-23.53***
-0.822
-19.45***
-0.803
-16.49***
-0.807
-15.27***
-0.865
-15.32***
-0.906
-15.42***
-0.860
-13.82***
-0.771
-11.25***
-0.679
-9.12***
-0.578
-7.35***
-0.457
-5.6***
-0.409
-4.94***
-0.426
-4.99***
-0.408
-4.65***
-0.372
-4.03***
-0.292
-3.11***
-0.052
-0.54
0.149
1.57
0.256
2.66***

Excess Returns
Returns
t-stat
-0.455
-23.07***
-0.559
-22.93***
-0.650
-24.29***
-0.802
-25.65***
-0.870
-25.66***
-0.908
-24.98***
-0.889
-21.01***
-0.883
-18.09***
-0.895
-16.9***
-0.959
-16.95***
-1.006
-17.09***
-0.969
-15.53***
-0.891
-12.97***
-0.812
-10.87***
-0.723
-9.17***
-0.610
-7.45***
-0.568
-6.84***
-0.591
-6.9***
-0.582
-6.59***
-0.556
-6***
-0.490
-5.18***
-0.261
-2.73***
-0.068
-0.71
0.034
0.35
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Abnormal Returns
Returns
t-stat
-0.370
-2.96**
-0.221
-1.28
-0.113
-0.36
-0.195
-0.61
-0.708
-5.6***
2.238
0.86
-0.937
-3.05**
0.905
0.68
0.927
0.66
0.323
0.37
-2.235
-1.58
-52.037
-1.11
1.426
0.7
3.141
0.89
3.530
0.9
-1.777
-1.91*
12.843
1.04
0.616
0.47
0.658
0.48
1.511
0.69
-7.659
-1.25
-8.100
-1.24
-4.329
-1.39
-49.075
-1.12

25

0.269

2.74***

0.040

0.41

26
27
28
29
30

0.248
0.309
0.318
0.407
0.463

2.47**
3***
2.98***
3.72***
4.17***

0.011
0.061
0.057
0.134
0.181

0.11
0.59
0.53
1.21
1.62
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129.165
2.573
3.167
9.910
-1.924
3.660

-1.11
0.83
0.85
0.99
-2.82**
0.83

Table 3.5 Returns of “Sell” Portfolios (2008 to 2015)
This table shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted portfolios
consisting of firms with “Sell” recommendations. Abnormal returns are the intercept from
the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) estimated following
Fama and MacBeth (1973):
(1)
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡
where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is excess return of a portfolio of small stocks
over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of a portfolio of high book-tomarket-value stocks over a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 is the
excess return on the prior-period winners portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio.
The data for the factor portfolio returns are from Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS). The sample period is from the fiscal year 2008 to 2015. Two-sided statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The
significance level for the mean is based on t-statistics calculated with Newey-West
autocorrelation-adjusted (3-lags) standard errors.
Days
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Raw Returns
Returns t-stat
-0.352 -19.94***
-0.346 -14.86***
-0.288 -11.36***
-0.277
-9.79***
-0.286
-9.16***
-0.330
-8.73***
-0.323
-7.22***
-0.340
-6.65***
-0.378
-6.72***
-0.413
-6.82***
-0.398
-6.4***
-0.362
-5.58***
-0.450
-6.5***
-0.565
-7.79***
-0.568
-7.47***
-0.518
-6.57***
-0.465
-5.75***
-0.441
-5.49***
-0.392
-4.92***
-0.365
-4.54***
-0.328
-3.9***
-0.304
-3.48***
-0.251
-2.81***
-0.275
-3***

Excess Returns
Returns t-stat
-0.353
-20***
-0.348 -14.93***
-0.290 -11.44***
-0.280
-9.88***
-0.290
-9.26***
-0.334
-8.84***
-0.328
-7.34***
-0.347
-6.77***
-0.385
-6.84***
-0.420
-6.94***
-0.406
-6.52***
-0.370
-5.7***
-0.459
-6.63***
-0.575
-7.93***
-0.579
-7.61***
-0.530
-6.72***
-0.477
-5.9***
-0.453
-5.64***
-0.405
-5.09***
-0.379
-4.71***
-0.343
-4.07***
-0.320
-3.66***
-0.267
-2.99***
-0.292
-3.19***
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Abnormal Returns
Returns t-stat
-0.464 -6.56***
-0.336 -3.86***
-0.317 -3.02**
-0.298 -2.15*
-0.460 -7.31***
-0.714 -3.02**
-0.536 -4.46***
-0.251 -1.37
-0.493 -3.67***
-0.361 -3.11**
-0.483 -3.94***
-0.475 -3.55***
-0.153 -0.72
-0.107 -0.44
-0.718 -1.82
0.169
0.43
-0.134 -1.35
0.111
0.37
-0.110 -1.03
-0.119 -1.03
-0.614 -1.68
-0.592 -1.75
-0.705 -1.54
-0.189 -1.62

25
26
27
28
29
30

-0.333
-0.308
-0.240
-0.178
-0.055
-0.002

-3.63***
-3.38***
-2.66***
-1.91*
-0.57
-0.02

-0.351
-0.326
-0.259
-0.198
-0.075
-0.023
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-3.82***
-3.58***
-2.86***
-2.12**
-0.79
-0.23

0.257
0.368
-0.435
-1.259
-0.997
-1.117

0.57
0.6
-2.85**
-1.74
-2.13*
-1.94*

Table 3.6 Returns of “Sell” Portfolios (2010 to 2015)
This table shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted portfolios
consisting of firms with “Sell” recommendations. Abnormal returns are the intercept from
the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) estimated
following Fama and MacBeth (1973):
(1)
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡
where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is excess return of a portfolio of small stocks
over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of a portfolio of high book-tomarket-value stocks over a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 is the
excess return on the prior-period winners portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio.
The data for the factor portfolio returns are from Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS). The sample period is from the fiscal year 2010 to 2015. Two-sided statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The
significance level for the mean is based on t-statistics calculated with Newey-West
autocorrelation-adjusted (3-lags) standard errors.
Days
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Raw Returns
Excess Returns
Abnormal Returns
Returns t-stat
Returns t-stat
Returns t-stat
-0.449 -23.43*** -0.449
-23.44***
-0.449 -10.56***
-0.466 -18.81*** -0.466
-18.82***
-0.449
-6.73***
-0.443 -17.05*** -0.443
-17.06***
-0.442
-6.97***
-0.452 -15.91*** -0.453
-15.93***
-0.482
-5.28***
-0.485 -15.59*** -0.485
-15.61***
-0.521
-4.52***
-0.529 -14.68*** -0.530
-14.7***
-0.523
-3.68**
-0.568 -13.39*** -0.568
-13.41***
-0.501
-3.24**
-0.586 -11.92*** -0.587
-11.94***
-0.462
-2.57**
-0.620 -11.45*** -0.622
-11.47***
-0.449
-2.43*
-0.675 -11.61*** -0.676
-11.62***
-0.459
-2.61**
-0.619 -10.37*** -0.621
-10.39***
-0.456
-2.56*
-0.609 -10.07*** -0.610
-10.1***
-0.434
-2.36*
-0.671 -10.76*** -0.673
-10.78***
-0.418
-2.3*
-0.818 -12.32*** -0.819
-12.34***
-0.421
-2.97**
-0.822 -11.65*** -0.824
-11.67***
-0.351
-2.25*
-0.786 -10.58*** -0.788
-10.61***
-0.307
-1.84
-0.717
-9.37*** -0.719
-9.39***
-0.242
-1.51
-0.701
-9.04*** -0.704
-9.07***
-0.255
-1.66
-0.683
-8.72*** -0.686
-8.75***
-0.241
-1.79
-0.655
-8.27*** -0.657
-8.29***
-0.248
-1.59
-0.675
-8.22*** -0.678
-8.25***
-0.268
-1.79
-0.668
-7.87*** -0.670
-7.9***
-0.252
-1.6
-0.616
-7.15*** -0.619
-7.18***
-0.230
-1.32
-0.653
-7.5*** -0.656
-7.53***
-0.252
-1.47
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25
26
27
28
29
30

-0.687
-0.718
-0.695
-0.699
-0.618
-0.591

-7.89***
-8.36***
-8.23***
-8.13***
-7.05***
-6.62***

-0.690
-0.721
-0.698
-0.702
-0.622
-0.594
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-7.92***
-8.39***
-8.26***
-8.17***
-7.09***
-6.65***

-0.243
-0.335
-0.382
-0.524
-0.541
-0.542

-1.64
-1.74
-1.83
-2.51*
-2.51*
-2.57**
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable
Book Equity (BE)
Market Equity (ME)
Book Leverage (BL)
Market Leverage (ML)
Property, Plant & Equipment
(PPE)
Profitability (EBITD)
Research and Development
Expenses (R&D)
Selling Expenses (SE)
Firm Size (Size)
Abnormal Short Interest (ABSI)

Market-to-book (MB)

Dispersion
Performance
Liquidity
Spread

Vol
AmexDummy
NasdaqDummy
Unexpected quarterly earnings
(UQE)

Definitions
Total assets – [total liabilities + preferred stock] +
deferred taxes + convertible debt.
Common shares outstanding x price.
[Short-term + long-term debt]/[Total Assets]
[Short-term + long-term debt]/[Total Assets – Book
Equity + Market Equity]
Net property, plant, and equipment/total assets.
Earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation/total
assets.
Research and development expense/sales.
Selling expense/sales.
Natural logarithm of net sales.
Pre-announcement short interest divided by nonannouncement short interest, all minus 1:
𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1)
(2)
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1) =
−1
𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−62 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−6)
where t indicates the date of earnings announcement
for the firm i.
The product of shares outstanding and price divided
by the book value of total common equity, all at the
end of each quarter.
The standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided
by the previous quarter-end stock price.
Prior quarter-end income before extraordinary items
divided by prior quarter-end total assets.
The natural log of daily trading volume averaged
across each quarter.
The daily bid price less daily ask price, divided by the
average of the bid price plus the ask price, averaged
across each quarter.
The standard deviation of daily stock returns for each
quarter.
A dummy variable coded one for a firm listed on the
American Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise.
A dummy variable coded one for a firm listed on the
Nasdaq Stock Market (SM), and zero otherwise.
It is defined as the residual from the following
regression:
86

𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−1 + 𝛽2 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−4
+ 𝛽3 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−8 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑞

Prediction
IndependentBoards

(1)

where i indexes firms; EPS is actual earnings per
share of the announcement quarter (q), the prior
quarter (q-1), one year ago (q-4), and two years ago
(q-8).
A dummy variable coded one when ABSI is positive
and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise.
It is dummy variable coded one if independent
directors constitute a majority of the board and zero
otherwise.
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